In introducing the paper circulated, Sir Noel Ashbridge observed that although the situations in Germany would not probably [illegible] be very effective in jamming our own broadcasts in this country, [illegible] those under German control in Holland would be effective over 4 [illegible] large area. The B.B.C. had worked out a scheme to deal with [illegible] contingency of the enemy broadcasting on our own wavelengths. [illegible] had also considered reprisals by the methods stated in the [illegible] These technical measures offered no serious differently, apa[illegible] a certain time lag, but there might be great difficulty in[illegible] a decision in a time of crisis to put them into operations. [illegible] proposal to re-open all pre-war stations on different wave[illegible] would cut across the system of synchronisation. The present synchronisation arrangements were established on security by the [illegible] Cabinet, acting on the advice of the Secretary of State for Air. Proposals which went behind these arrangements could therefore only be made under equivalent authority.
The practical difficulties likely to arise in the crisis were discussed. In practice a technical decision on the security aspect would normally be taken by the Air Council acting on the advice of the Director of Signals. It might prove impracticable to get much a decision without difficulty and delay. It might, however, be possible to seek agreement with the Air Ministry to apply the scheme, or part of the scheme, under specified conditions (e.g. clear visibility) when the assistance afforded to the enemy by the adoption of the scheme would be of minimum value.
It was thought unlikely that the Air Ministry would commit themselves in advance to adopt any particular set of conditions. It was finally decided that the Minister should write to the Secretary to State for Air, stating the problem and asking for machinery to be set up jointly with the Air Ministry, Ministry of Information and B.B.C. Our aim should be to ensure that when the emergency arose there was someone in authority at the Air Ministry whose duty it should be to listen to our representations as to the necessity for some or all of the proposals in the paper circulated, and to decide, or obtain without delay a decision from still higher authority, whether on security grounds agreement could be given to their operation.
[A.P.W.]
2.
POSSIBILITY OF WARNING PUBLIC AS TO FALSE BROADCASTS
.
It was reported that the question had been raised whether the Minister should be invited to broadcast a warning that the enemy night attempt to send out false news on our wavelengths. The recommendation had been made by a committee on which the B.B.C. were represented but Mr. Ogilvie, personal view, was not anxious that this should be undertaken at least at present. He was inclined to think that experience so far gave little ground for anticipating serious difficulties arising. It was [illegible] that a broadcast address should be prepared and [illegible] consideration should be given to the question when[illegible]was available.
[illegible]
SECRET ENEMY MESSAGES
.
Mr. Frost referred to arrangements which had recently [illegible] made to watch for secret enemy broadcasts to their own [illegible]in this country and enquired to whom any directive [illegible]should be sent and what other action should be taken on them. During discussion the view was expressed that the Ministry of Home Security might be invited to set up a body to deal with such messages. The Minister took the view that the primary responsibility lay with the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, and that another channel might create confusion.
It was decided that the Deputy Secretary should go the question with the Ministry of Home Security and the [illegible]-in-Chief, Home Forces.
[illegible]OF [illegible]ORDER ON B.B.C. AND JOURNALISTS
.
It was estimated that 150 B.B.C. employees might be [illegible] by the Curfew Order. It was, however, noted that in London this only operated after 12 midnight and this number might therefore be reduced.
A similar problem also affected foreign journalists. Mr. Macadam stated that there was to be a conference with the Home Office, probably the same day, and it was agreed that Mr. Peake and Mr. Lints Smith should prepare a list of foreign journalists and that Mr. Ogilvie should provide a list of foreign employees at the B.B.C., and that the Home Office should be invited to take such measures as might be effective in allowing these persons to carry on their work.
[4.]
5.
NORWEGIAN BROADCASTING
.
Sir Noel Ashbridge referred to the request from the Norwegian authorities that we should provide staff and apparatus in the unoccupied part of Norway. The staff had already moved but the despatch of apparatus was held up. It was noted that the Minister had decided against continuing the project and the Foreign Office had been asked to communicate this decision to the Norwegians. It was agreed that the plant might be used for other purpose but that we should wait before withdrawing the B.B.C. staff until we had ascertained whether they considered that they could serve a useful purpose by remaining.
[5.]
6.
PAPER RATIONING
.
Discussion of the paper circulated at the last meeting was continued. The Director General thought that our request for 5,000 tons for the remaining eight months of the year was a
62
reasonable one. Mr. Bevan observed that it had been thought desirable to shelve recommendations about periodicals, which consume an amount of paper out of all proportion to the ration which we might anticipate for the normal purposes of the Ministry. After discussion the proposals in the paper were agreed.
7.
ALLIED PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
.
[6.]
The paper circulated was discussed. Sir Frederick Whyte observed that the basis of the suggestions was the use of the lesser Allies to address the remaining great neutral. Lord Perth considered that any such approach would be very dangerous if it were known that we were behind it. This objection would not apply to the French. It was agreed that the idea should be laid before the Foreign Office who should be invited to find out if the neutrals were contemplating an individual approach to the United States.
8.
POSTERS FOR FREE SPACE
.
The Director General explained that there had been correspondence with Sir Ralph Wedgewood in which he had made certain offers as to the use of free boarding space belonging to the railways for the Poster Campaign. These proposals would enable us to make use of an Empire series of posters already prepared, if it was agreed that they should be used. The posters were inspected and approved for the purpose.
[7.]
Mr. Bevan stated that the drawings of another series had been prepared and the Ministry was in favour of going on with this, subject to the Ministry obtaining a reasonable ration of paper. It was noted that about six tons of paper were required for each series.
1. Machinery for [illegible] Jamming
2. Broadcast modern space broadcasts. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible]
think out enough technical instructions to keep a continuous supply of interesting and stimulating material. Lord Davidson undertook to provide Mr. Nicolson with some suggested instructions.
[5]
The discussion also turned on the question of cost and paper for Lord Davidson's suggestion. It was pointed out that a weekly distribution of ten million copies of a leaflet would consume about l800 tons of paper at a cost of about £75,000. The Deputy Secretary referred to a paper (which was then circulated) on the question of the Ministry's paper ration. It appeared probable that the Ministry would probably be able to justify applying for about 5,000 tons per annum (up to the end of 1940).It was not known whether the Committee in charge would agree to this and in the light of this figure Lord Davidson agreed that a weekly distribution of a leaflet such as he proposed would probably be excessive.
Further discussion of the paper was deferred until the next day.
1. Minutes taking up broadcasting [illegible] of war.
