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Appendix

France

In France all our propaganda must lead up to the central theme of the defence of France and the magnitude of the contribution which we are making to it. In order not to seem patronising and condescending (a serious pitfall), we must emphasise that French security and our own are identical. To make British achievements and British ways of thought known in France is important. It is still more important to show readiness in this country to understand and appreciate French achievements and French ways of thought. The menace of a Germany of 100,000,000 people rather than the menace of Hitlerism should be a leitmotif of our propaganda. Generalisations about a future European order (or still more, a future world order) are dangerous unless it is made clear that we do not envisage German participation in that new order on terms which would not provide adequate guarantees for French security.

The Small Western Neutrals (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland.)

In these countries, we have to deal with a population which is not only intelligent, educated and in enjoyment of a high standard of living, but is also exposed to the full blast of German propaganda and to the pressure of Germany's military strength. Our task is therefore an exacting one. Neither boastfulness nor vituperation will help us here. We can and should insist on our military strength; but we must back our insistence by the concrete evidence of facts and figures. We must be somewhat reticent about our economic strength (though we can advertise the economic weakness of Germany). The blockade is a sore point in all these countries; and anything that sounds like a threat of economic pressure, or a boast of its efficacy, is ill received. We must strongly stress the common character of our interests (the independence of small nations) and of the values for which we stand (democracy, freedom of opinion, social services, industrial legislation, etc.) All these are countries with which we normally have important trade relations; and all except Switzerland are sea-faring nations. This community of interest will suggest many themes of propaganda. Our object must be to drive home the lesson that the danger to their way of life and to their very existence which would result from a German victory outweighs the minor inconveniences and annoyances of the British blockade.

On the other hand, all these countries (except Belgium) were neutral in the last war and are free - or have been until recently - from any marked anti-German bias. Most of them are more or less strongly impregnated with German culture and have turned to Germany at any rate for their technical education. They have a certain traditional mistrust of France, which, though at present latent, will revive with the defeat of Germany. They are all, for one reason or another, strongly anti-Bolshevik; and it is therefore useful to insist on the present complicity between the Nazi and Soviet regimes. But are they susceptible to the argument that the collapse of Germany following a complete military defeat would expose Western Europe to the Russian menace. It may therefore be undesirable to let it be thought that our aim is to break up Germany; and (Belgium being once more the exception) the theme that we are fighting Hitlerism rather than the German people is still the most acceptable line in these countries.

Finally, nothing should be said to suggest that we are seeking to bring them into the war on our side. Any such suggestion creates resentment. We should emphasise that what we want from them is a friendly neutrality, and that we will help them to maintain it.

Italy

The problem of propaganda in Italy is complicated by the fact that the relation between public opinion and official policy is far less close than in democratic countries, and that the former is more favourable to the British Cause than the latter. Any intensive effort to make Italian public opinion more openly favourable to us would be of somewhat doubtful value, and might excite the resentment of the authorities. The same applies to any overt attempt to use the Catholic Church and its organs as a vehicle of propaganda in Italy.

Our propaganda must in these circumstances always be conducted with one eye on the Italian Government and the fascist leaders. The latter have unquestionably been impressed with the apparently invincible efficiency of Nazi Germany and have acquired a shade of contempt for the easy-going and pacific attitude of what Signor Mussolini calls the “pluto-democracies”. It is even more urgent to convince Italian official circles of the hollowness of German strength than of the hollowness of German friendship. We must show them that we are not less efficient than Germany for being less ruthless and less boastful. Nowhere is it more important to stress the earnestness of the British war effort. British military and economic strength must be continually driven home, but with a certain caution in the methods adopted for the purpose. Every Italian is prompt to resent the suggestion that Italy can be shut up in the Mediterranean by British naval strength, or that she is dependent for vital raw materials on the British command of the seas. The blockade is resented less perhaps for its concrete inconveniences than for the implication that Italy is at the mercy of Britain's military and economic power.

It is undesirable in Italy to feature our hostility to “Hitlerism”, since this inevitably suggests affinities with Fascism. But we can stress our resistance to further German expansion in Europe. It is unnecessary to rub in Germany's disregard for Italian interests in her annexation of Austria, in her advance towards the Balkans, in her pact with Soviet Russia, and in her economic policy. All this Italy sees and resents without any prompting from us. But flattering expression of community of interest between Britain and Italy in the colonial sphere will be welcomed; the prospects of economic collaboration should be stressed; and the key-note of any references to the coming peace or to a future European order should be not “security” but “justice”, which implies to the Italian mind sympathetic consideration of Italy's claims. Italy likes to think of herself as “progressive”, not “reactionary”; and we should endeavour to show ourselves in the same light.

Spain and Portugal

The situation in Spain has analogies with the situation in Italy in that a clear distinction must be drawn between public opinion and the opinion of the governing group, and that any attempt to influence the latter through the former exposes us to obvious dangers. Uncertainty as to the future of domestic politics in Spain adds to the day-to-day difficulties of our propaganda. But there are two lines which are perfectly safe and always effective; (1) insistence on German hostility to the Catholic Church and all the values for which it stands and (2) the insistence on the German-Soviet Pact and on the close co-operation between Germany and Soviet Russia resulting from it - a flagrant piece of treachery to the ideals which Germany was supposed to have been supporting in the Spanish Civil War. On the other hand, there is perhaps less advantage in Spain than elsewhere in emphasising British strength. Spain is less susceptible than most countries to fear of a German victory; and British naval power is inevitably associated in Spanish minds with Gibraltar. The potentialities of economic co-operation between the two countries can usefully be stressed.

In Portugal, our propaganda should be conducted in such a way as not to offend the susceptibilities of the Portuguese Government, whose attitude on vital issues differs from our own only in degree. The two themes referred to above as specially suitable for Spain, i.e. Nazi hostility to the Catholic Church and Nazi complicity with Soviet Russia, are equally well adapted to Portugal. On the positive side, references to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, to the long-standing commercial relations between the two countries, and to their community of interest as colonial Powers give unfailing satisfaction to the Portuguese mind.

Central and South Eastern Europe.

There is little point here in exposing the sinister character of Germany's aim or indulging in moral diatribes at her expense. These countries are under no illusion as to the fate which awaits them in the event of a German victory. The object of our propaganda must be to convince them that such a victory is impossible or improbable, and that they can therefore afford to stand out against German pressure. British might is the one essential theme, which must be driven home by every means at our disposal. Insistence on a common tradition with Western Europe and on common interests where these can be demonstrated (e.g. relations between Britain and Greece as two sea-faring nations) will furnish a subsidiary point of some value.

The Middle East.

In this area we have to overtake an elaborate German effort, extending over several years, backed by lavish expenditure. The problem is complicated by the general attraction exercised over the Oriental mind by “successful strength”, whether or not combined with justice. Accordingly, our two main themes must be the overwhelming strength, potential and actual of the Allies; and the irreligious character of the Nazi regime. We have to be careful not to exaggerate the devastating character of modern warfare for 244 - 10 -fear of alarming those to whom we are appealing. We must represent the Allies as the protectors of peoples who desire to live their own lives, and the staunch friends of small nations who have succeeded in acquiring their independence. Co-operation with the French authorities, both in Northern Africa, the Levant, and the Red Sea littoral, needs to be carefully cultivated. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Arab and the non-Arab countries of the Middle East present many distinct problems, which require separate treatment.

The Far East.

The problem of our publicity in the Far East is dominated by the fact that the local situation entirely overshadows interest in the European war, and reduces the latter to a secondary factor judged mainly in the light of its reactions on that situation. British strength is our one effective and unvarying propaganda theme throughout the far East. Our object is to make known British achievements and British resources in the military, economic and social spheres in such terms as will convince the Far Eastern peoples that Britain is still a great world power, that her ultimate victory is certain, and that this victory will once more make her a powerful factor in Far Eastern affairs. Japan's dependence for her prosperity on access to British Empire markets and raw materials makes the German autarkic system a specially suitable target for attack in that country. If we condemn aggression, we shall do so with a certain restraint, remembering that the Japanese admire force. We cannot, however, have one propaganda for China and another for Japan; there may be local variations of theme and emphasis, but we must take the same general line in both countries. China will want us to win only if she is persuaded that we will then help her to resist Japan. Japan will not object to our winning only if she is persuaded that we will acquiesce in her plans for dominating China. To retain the goodwill of China and regain that of Japan are equally difficult. Surrenders to Japan rendered necessary by local weakness are not easily reconciled with claims to be a great and powerful country. Our attitude therefore is that, being preoccupied elsewhere, we cannot fully maintain our local interests but that, being a great and powerful nation and being certain of ultimate victory, nothing will induce us, for the sake of those interests, to sacrifice one iota of our principles. We thus aim at gaining the friendship of China, the respect of Japan and above all the support of the United States, which are apt to regard British policy in China as the touchstone of British good faith. In the Far East propaganda is to a peculiar degree intertwined with policy.

Latin America .

The area in question is so vast, so diversified, and so remote from the main theatre of war that any attempt to lay down general lines for our propaganda is a matter of abnormal difficulty. It may be taken as an axiom that we are not seeking to bring Latin America into the War on our side. Any such attempt would certainly he viewed with mistrust in the United States; and the chances of success,