CONFIDENTIAL
JOINT MEMORADUM ON PUBLICITY ABOUT THE FOOD SITUATION IN EUROPE
At a meeting held on August 19th at the Ministry of Economic Warfare and attended by representatives of that Ministry and of the Ministry of Information, including Mr. Dingle Foot M.P., and the Hon. Harold Nicolson M.P., it was decided to submit the following joint memorandum to the Ministers of Economic Warfare and of Information. It sets out the aims and methods to he pursued in presenting to U.S. opinion the official point of view about the food situation in German-controlled Europe during the coming winter, and deals more particularly with the direct handling of news items by the Press Section of M.E.W. It was further decided that this joint memorandum should be submitted by Mr. Harold Nicolson to the Director of the B.B.C., who should communicate its conclusions throughout all departments of the B.B.C. for guidance.
A.
THE SITUATION
The Germans claim that there are ample supplies of food available in Europe and that there need be no famine. On the assumption that their own figures for reserves of bread grains at the end of June, 1940 (7,000,000 tons) are correct, and that reserves elsewhere in Europe at the same date amounted to 3,000,000 tons and, on the further assumption that the Germans will impose on the whole of German-Europe the appropriate agricultural and civilian rationing policies, this German claim may be accepted as formally correct.
On the basis of the lowest of the three estimates which we have made of European harvests this season, and on the assumption that throughout German-controlled Europe potatoes and grains fit for human consumption will not be fed to livestock, a number of calories per head of the population sufficient to sustain life can be provided until the harvest of 1941 is collected. As the actual yield of this year's harvest will probably be appreciably higher than the lowest estimate, the number of calories available per head will be pro tanto increased.
Further, condensed and dried milk, suitable for children, is produced in large quantities in the Netherlands, and in smaller quantities in Switzerland, Germany and France. Most of this product was imported into the U.K. before the war, and is now all available for consumption in the enslaved area.
The crucial difficulty is, therefore, much more one of transport, civil administration and of basic German policy than of absolute shortage. If the German stocks are to be preserved as a war reserve for the Herrenvolk, then the subject populations will go short. If oil is to be used for military purposes, and civilian transportation restricted, the food available will not be sufficiently and equitably distributed. If the productive policy of the whole of European agriculture and the loyalty of its producers is not secured, supplies will begin to fall short in the second half of the inter-harvest period of 1940/41.
It is virtually certain that the Germans, even if they [illegible] will fail to solve the many technical and administrative difficulties which must be overcome if this year's harvest and present reserves are to be distributed so as to prevent localised famine or privation during the coming year. It is, indeed, improbable that the Germans will really try to do so. The political importance to the Nazi regime of maintaining, if not increasing, the present level of rations in Greater Germany, will almost certainly compel them to take more than their fair share of the total supplies available to German Europe. The position that now exists in Poland may be reproduced elsewhere - two rationing schemes, one for Germans and the other for Poles.
B.
OUR POLICY
The present policy of H.M.G. is to blockade enemy and enemy occupied territories, including “unoccupied” France, and to prevent the entry into this Enslaved Area of any goods which would aid the enemy in his war effort. Such goods, of course, include foodstuffs.
C.
PROPAGANDA FROM THE U.S.
We have already seen the beginning of a propaganda campaign in the U.S. in favour of American relief to the civilian populations of the occupied territories. This campaign may grow and will be supported by (1) misguided humanitarians, (2) certain exporting interests, (3) American statesmen who are seeking publicity (4) German propagandists.
D.
THE IMPRESSION WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK TO CONVEY
Stated in very general terms, our argument must be that there are sufficient present and prospective supplies of basic foods in Europe to prevent serious privation, provided that the Nazi Government organise distribution properly and refrain from the exploitation of occupied and indirectly controlled territories in order to maintain or increase the rations of the Germans themselves. (Incidentally very similar conclusions are reached in a report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the full text of which is not yet available).
Autumn, when all the harvests have just been gathered in, is the last season of the year when there should be any talk of famine. And if there is any such talk, it is solely due to the deliberate Nazi policy of “Guns before Butter” and to maldistribution by the Germans themselves.
We have yet a further line of defence, namely to say that if we did allow food into German-occupied or German controlled territories, the Germans would either get hold of it themselves or would at any rate indirectly profit through the freeing of equivalent stocks. Further, most foodstuffs can be converted into material directly useful to the enemy's armed forces; fats can be turned into explosives, grains into fuel alcohol, milk into plastic materials. If we are specifically tackled about unoccupied France, we can point out that there is very little distinction in practice between unoccupied France,
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and that the at [illegible]one people of, [illegible]ay, Holland and Poland under German. occupation entitles them to at least as much consideration as unoccupied France under the Petain Government.
E.
TACTICS IN THE HANDLING OF NEWS
We want, so far as we can, to avoid the impression that we are conducting propaganda. We therefore do not want either (1) to start a publicity campaign at this time (this has been agreed with the Planning Committee of the Ministry of Information, who will neither stifle nor stimulate discussion in this country) or (2) to force our interpretation of the situation on American correspondents in London. It is much better to let the latter come to us of their own accord. This they are beginning to do quite satisfactorily and, so far as can be judged at present, they are being most helpful.
Besides giving stories direct to American correspondents, there is a second way of getting at AMERICAN opinion by encouraging the publication here and there in the British press of articles by leading British journalists. These can be so written as to avoid giving the impression of direct official inspiration and they will serve our purpose by being quoted in despatches by U.S. Correspondents in London to their papers in America, and by stimulating American correspondents to continue coming to us for stories.
So far, we have not done much more than state the situation in general terms on the lines described in section D above. What we must now do is to fill in the outline with news items. In doing this, we should leave the moral to be inferred, rather than state it ourselves. We should not protest too much and the effective presentation of detailed news items will now do more to make our case look solid than any amount of general argument. At the same time, the constructive side of British policy should be emphasised wherever possible, along the lines of the Prime Minister's statement of 20th August:
“Meanwhile, we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces, and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including - I say it deliberately - the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.
The following are the main headings under which we should look for news items:
(1) Exploitation of Germany's alleged and much boasted “blockade of Britain”.
(2) German and Italian assertions that food resources are abundant.
Impartial reports indicating good harvests and production of foodstuffs.
(4) Evidence of unnatural plenty in Germany, e.g. increased rations, coupled with
(5) Evidence of increasingly stringent rationing in occupied territories.
(6) German looting in occupied territories.
(7) Financial exploitation of occupied territories.
(8) Export of food from occupied territories to neutral destinations.
(9) Conversion of foodstuffs into war material.
(10) The breakdown in material and human terms of the Nazi economic organisation and administration.
(11) American reactions to food problems, on which immediate comment might be issued by British journalists for quotation in America.
(12) Illustrations of the constructive policy, outlined by the Prime Minister, with regard to eventual relief for Europe.
We do not want anything to be issued at present which bears the stamp of an Official statement. On the other hand, public opinion should be prepared through occasional articles by well-known journalists or preferably by editorial comment in newspapers. General talks broadcast from time to time by the B.B.C. would also be of great value.
