A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46

17

SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUTHERN REGION NO. 6 MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
1939 - 1945

18
  • INTRODUCTION Page 1

  • REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 3

  • LOCAL INFORMATION COMMITTEES 3

  • HOME FRONT LEAGUES 5

  • REGIONAL BULLETIN 6

  • CAMPAIGNS & DISPLAYS 6

  • MEETINGS 8

  • INTELLIGENCE 9

  • FLIMS 10

  • PRESS & CENSORSHIP 10

  • POST BLITZ & EMERGENCY 12

  • CHANNEL ISLANDS 14

  • APPENDIX:-

    • AIR RAID EMERGENCY WORK

      • SOUTHAMPTON 15

      • PORTSMOUTH 19

      • COWES 21

      • WEYMOUTH 23

19 20

I. INTRODUCTION.

(a) Area .

When the Southern Regional Office of the Ministry of Information began its work on 5th September, 1939, the area of its operations covered the counties of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Hampshire, the Isle of Wight, Surrey, and part of Dorset.

Eighteen months later, on 10th March, 1941, Surrey was handed over to the South-Eastern Region, and the Southern Region was extended to include the whole of Dorset, which up to then had been divided between the Southern and South Western Regions.

The Southern Region now comprises the six counties of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Hampshire, Dorset, the Isle of Wight, and also the Channel Islands. According to the last census, the population of the Region is about 2,200,000 and the area is approximately 4,850 square miles.

In February 1943 the R.I.O. was asked to consider the inclusion of Wiltshire in the Southern Region for emergency purposes, but this was felt to be impracticable owing to the overlapping of authorities and to the fact that it would entail duplication of work with the Ministry of Home Security, Wiltshire coming under the jurisdiction of the South Western Regional Commissioner.

(b) Changes and Special Problems brought about by war .

Before the war, probably 90 per cent of the Southern Region was agricultural. There are a large number of small market towns and only five towns - Reading, Oxford, Portsmouth, Southampton and Bournemouth - with over 100,000 population.

The principal change in the character of the Region during the war was caused by the establishment in many rural areas, formerly entirely devoted to agriculture, of new war factories, military camps and aerodromes. Among the effects of this change have been the difficulty of housing the workers for the new factories and the contractors’ men working on aerodrome and camp sites (including Irish labour); problems of transport where adequate housing has not been available near the new factories; increased prosperity for village and small town tradesmen; high pay obtainable on camp sites and aerodromes by former rural workers (thus complicating the labour problems of farmers); and the alteration in the character of village and small town life through the introduction of new elements into the rural population.

Here the influx of evacuees from London, the coastal towns and even from Birmingham in 1940 and 1941 and to a less extent in 1944 complicated matters still further.

The shift of population due to the bombing of the Region's two chief ports caused special difficulties of accommodation and transport in Southern districts.

The presence of a considerable number of United States Forces in the Region also added complications. The attraction of their easy friendliness and lavish expenditure for adolescent girls, their lack of sufficient amusement during leave, the complication of their coloured troops, all caused certain difficulties, decreased after the opening of the campaign in France.

In fact, overpopulation was in many ways the major war problem of the Region with its large share of responsibility for difficulties and grievances arising out of housing, transport and food shortages.

It was also during the latter part of the war aggravated by the vast number of American troops in the Region and by the fact that the Region provided the principal spring-boards for the invasion of Europe. According to the Regional Office of the Board of Trade, one of the most accurate indices of our congestion lay in the fact that whereas in 1944 it was still possible in the North of England for laundries to return washing in a few days, here three weeks was the average time needed for the process.

All of this, coupled with the American occupation, D-day preparations, etc., considerably increased the responsibilities and activities of this office and its local workers.

The setting up of the Regional office fell into the general pattern of the Home Front activities of the Ministry. At first we concentrated upon the formation of Local Information Committees. Here, as elsewhere, it was soon discovered that the constituency basis would not work. We therefore proceeded to set up committees how and where they were needed, conforming only with our instructions from London as to their three party basis, the leadership of the Local Authorities in their make-up, the inclusion of voluntary organisations, etc., etc., But it was early apparent that our committee system would be patchy. The Region (and the South is not committee-minded) had already about as many local committees as it would bear, the standing of the Ministry had been badly impaired by the much publicised collapse of its London organisation in the autumn of 1939 and our efforts on behalf of L.I.Cs. were further hampered by the nebulosity of our instructions as to the nature of their activities.

Hence, while some committees were got going on a satisfactory basis, we had it emphatically borne in on us that unless the Region was to lose interest in us to a damaging degree pending the production of real work by Headquarters and/or enemy action, we should have to invent local activities for our would-be supporters over and above unconvincing agenda for doubting L.I.Cs. Home Front Leagues were our first effort in that direction, an effort considerably helped by the anti-rumour and anti-gossip campaign which was about the first nation-wide venture of the Ministry. But Home Front Leagues were soon squelched by London for reasons which it was not for us to question, as was our second effort to give to our mission a spirit of community co-operation, namely a Regional Bulletin directed to members of the Leagues and to our other local workers.

Luckily, just when we were in despair of discovering a convincing mission for our organisation, the enemy intervened and the air-raiding of the autumn of 1939 and the succeeding winter and the concurrent threat of invasion enabled us to set our L.I.Cs. and local workers a job which to them seemed worth doing, for it was to our L.I.Cs. that we first turned, not unsuccessfully, for our first local emergency organisations. During the same period also our meetings programme really got going with war commentaries (copied from Scotland) as their piéce de resistance. These war commentaries to a great extent did what we had hoped our Regional Bulletin and Home Front Leagues would do. They made for us in a number of places important nuclei of people interested in the work of the Ministry. Our film programme similarly developed into a Regional institution during the 1940-41 period; in 1941 our emergency organisation began to be spread through the Region to meet invasion as well as blitz conditions; our press activities were from the first concordant with the demands and desires of the Regional press, thanks largely to the excellence of the co-operation which it had from London; our campaigns and displays’ activities developed, so that by the end of 1941 we were well enough known and well enough supported to be in a position to meet the growing demands which our rapidly expanding programme made it necessary to levy upon our L.I.Cs. and local workers. In this development, details of which are given below, we were at all stages immeasurably helped by the excellence of our relations with the Regional Commissioner and his office and with the other Government offices in Reading.

21

3. (a) REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

In April 1940 the Ministry announced that Advisory Committees were to be set up in the Regions.

The formation of an Advisory Committee for the Southern Region was discussed by the R.I.O. and agents of the three Political Parties at a preliminary meeting at Reading on May 10th. From August until the following June the full Committee of twenty-two members, representing such organisations as the W.V.S., N.U.J., B.B.C., as well as the three political Parties, met every month to discuss the Regional work of the Ministry, point out what they considered its weaknesses, and suggest improvements in its organisation. One criticism which they levelled against the Ministry was its “failure” sufficiently to recognise the place of propaganda in modern warfare. They considered that its main function was propaganda rather than information and urged closer co-operation towards that end with all Departments. Brighter public meetings were advocated and a more effective distribution of literature was suggested.

The main difficulty faced by half the members of the Committee was the distance which they had to travel from their homes to Reading every month, a difficulty which naturally increased as the call for economy in the use of petrol became more insistent. From June 1941 the meetings of the Committee became less frequent and ceased after a meeting in July 1942. The R.A.C. was officially disbanded on 12th June, 1945, with thanks from Mr, Brendan Bracken for services rendered.

22

3. (b) INFORMATION COMMITTEES .

County Committees had been planned for Oxfordshire, Berkshire and Buckinghamshire, when at the beginning of October, 1939, we were suddenly told by London to suspend work in the Regions and to disband to a great extent the Regional offices.

The formation of Information Committees was from the very beginning greatly handicapped by the fact that the Ministry of Information had no definite policy in regard to the work of Committees. Considerable confusion was caused by the reference to three-Party meetings, and there was a good deal of timidity in coming to a decision about the necessary financial assistance. Where preliminary advances had been made towards forming Committees, annoyance and disappointment were caused through lack of definite instructions to proceed. When policy and finance questions were finally settled and a new Committee Officer was appointed in July 1940, the formation of Committees proceeded much more rapidly.

The danger to which the Three Party Committee is subjected finds an apt illustration in one which was formed at Farnborough, Hants. Originally set up on a Three Party basis, the Conservatives and Liberals displayed little interest and attended infrequently, whereas the Left Wing were enthusiastic, and the Committee consequently became lopsided and a source of continual anxiety to the Committee Officer.

Three of the earliest Information Committees established were at Oxford, Banbury and Bournemouth, and a short history of each follows:-

Oxford .

The D.R.I.O. attended the inaugural meeting of the Oxford Borough Information Committee on 2nd October, 1939. Although at one time it was suggested that it should be merged with the County and University Committees, it has nevertheless functioned throughout its history as an independent City Committee.

Twelve months later reconstitution was rendered necessary by the refusal of various organisations to recognise as their authorised representatives those who had been chosen by the Mayor in the autumn of 1939 and by their insisting on nominating new representatives.

As soon as the Committee had a satisfactory constitutional basis, it got on with the tasks allotted to it and formed Publicity, Emergency and Intelligence Sub-Committees. Public meetings and war commentaries, campaigns, exhibitions and film shows were organised and pronounced a success, though some criticism was heard regarding the large number of Government officials considered necessary in the organisation of a War Work Campaign and doubts were expressed as to whether the results justified the time and money expended on it.

The War Commentaries of one of the Ministry's staff speakers proved very popular in Oxford, and there was much regret when his name had to be removed from the panel on account of an indiscreet statement which he was alleged to have made during a talk. It was felt that the Ministry’ policy of “playing safe” would result in its losing its following in Oxford.

A special activity of the Committee in the early autumn of 1940 was the provision of speakers, film shows, and other forms of entertainment for the 750 air-raid refugees temporarily housed in the Majestic Cinema.

Several years later women members of the Committee were especially invited to visit the larger factories in the vicinity, e.g. the Morris Works, to see for themselves the part which their own sex was playing in the war effort.

The Committee gave invaluable services in arranging facility visits to factories for distinguished visitors and others.

Banbury .

This Committee was an offspring of the original County Committee, which gave birth in the autumn of 1939 to two Constituency Sub-Committees, one for North Oxfordshire and one for South Oxfordshire.

The North Oxon. Sub-Committee, which had been wanted to counteract the subversive tactics of the P.P.U. and other anti-war organisations in the Banbury area, died during the winter, and it was not until December 1941 that a permanent Committee was set up for Banbury and the Rural District. The delay in its formation was due to the fact that the demand for a new Committee had at first come mainly from the Labour Party and, in particular, from its Secretary - a very difficult personality to deal with. When the Committee met again in February the Labour Party withdrew its Secretary from membership of the Committee and nominated another representative, thus easing the situation. From that date until its final disbandment in June 1945 the Committee has worked most co-operatively and is proud of the fact that it has had the same Chairman and Secretary throughout its lifetime.

The Banbury L.I.C. appointed Publicity and Emergency Sub-committees and some of its members became Intelligence contacts for the Regional office. Other activities included the organisation of public meetings, one special feature being a series of open-air meetings in villages by a Staff Speaker, while another Staff Speaker toured the area by loud-speaker car; film shows, photographic displays; distribution of posters to shops, organisations, etc; campaigns, such as the Recruitment of Women Campaign, etc.,

The Committee was also largely instrumental in providing a British Restaurant for the town and in inducing the Forces Club to keep open late on Sunday evenings for the benefit of American troops.

Bournemouth.

Bournemouth was one of the earliest South Coast towns to have an Information Committee, the inaugural meeting being held on 31st January, 1940, under the Chairmanship of the Mayor. Mr. W. Birtwistle, of the Official Information Bureau, was elected Secretary and was still in 23 office when the Committee was dissolved in June 1945.

A Sub-Committee was formed at an early stage for the organisation of meetings and exhibitions and another for the Anti- Gossip Campaign, it being felt that the latter was particularly necessary in a town so full of such dangerous spots for gossip as hotels and boarding-houses. Anti-gossip posters were put into the hotels and a member of the Committee, who was also a representative of the Hotelier Association, was, with the Deputy Mayor, made responsible for anti-gossip lectures and conducted a special campaign in the hotels.

An Air-Raid Sub-Committee was formed early in 1941, and the L.I.C. Secretary was appointed Emergency Information Officer.

The many large stores such as Plummer Roddis, Beales, and Bobby's were not only ideal sites for some of the larger exhibitions but were excellent rendezvous for Works Meetings, and the Regional Meetings Officer and a Staff Speaker addressed some 3,000 people in this way. The R.I.O. also gave some much appreciated War Commentaries in the town. All of these activities were arranged through the L.I.C.

In connection with meetings, however, it should be stated that, soured from the beginning by the failure of some M.O.I. speakers to keep Town Hall appointments, the Bournemouth Committee waxed more and more bitter and periodically emitted strong complaints that, though supplied from time to time with some good speakers, it was never given speakers of its own choice, nor had a Cabinet Minister ever graced its platform.

Like Oxford, the Bournemouth Committee felt that the big Women's Recruitment Campaign was, in its results, a waste of time and money.

24

3 (c) HOME FRONT LEAGUES .

These products of the early Local Information Committees were a Regional attempt to carry out Mr. Harold Nicholson's “Mr. Sensible” idea. As one of the functions of Information Committees was to assist the Government in the maintenance of a healthy home front, it was felt that a good way of doing this was to select certain men and women members “noted for their robust commonsense and for the fact that they held positions of trust and responsibility” and ask them to set a personal example by preserving a cheerful outlook in the face of difficulties, to counteract rumour and gossip likely to undermine public confidence or to assist the enemy, and to disseminate information supplied to them by the Ministry of Information.

The Southampton Home Front League (or Home Security League, as it was called at first) was formed in June 1940. Nine others followed in quick succession, viz. Portsmouth, Bournemouth, Poole, New Forest, Winchester, Gosport, East Hants, Andover and Guildford. The number of members varied according to the size of the town. Portsmouth, for instance, had from 300 to 400 Home Front Leaguers, whereas Andover contented itself with between 50 and 60.

Copies of the Bulletin issued by the Regional Office were sent to each Home Front League, together with other literature providing background information of the war, and regular monthly meetings were held at which the Chairman of the mother Information Committee presided. As the Press was excluded from the meetings, matters of a confidential nature could be freely discussed. Sometimes, however, the meetings were thrown open to the public and attracted good audiences and good speakers. Mr. Amery was the speaker at a Portsmouth Home Front League on one occasion.

In October 1940, however, the Conservative & Unionist Central Office took exception to the Home Front League on the grounds that it was not one of the Ministry functions to establish such an organisation.

As a result, the Ministry began to have doubts as to the wisdom of extending the movement further, in spite of the fact that the recrudescence of a subversive element in the Region made it urgently necessary to strengthen the Home Front and that the Leagues had the enthusiastic support of the Regional Commissioner, among other people.

In the following April the Regional office was urged by London to discourage projects for new Home Front Leagues; only if local desire was too strong to ignore without detrimental results was one to be formed. This ultimatum proved the death blow to a once vigorous and useful organisation already enervated by the Ministry's “mark time” policy.

3. (d) REGIONAL BULLETIN.

With the object of supplying Information Committees and Home Front Leagues with material which would enable them to answer questions of national importance put to them by an anxious public, the Regional office issued a periodical Bulletin beginning in the summer months of 1940.

Committees and Home Front Leagues were asked to let the Regional office know if they wanted specific matters dealt with, so that these could be incorporated in subsequent numbers of the Bulletin, For example, in one district there was a good deal of loose talk in the early days of the war about Britain not being worse off if Hitler won than it was then, and it became obvious to the Committee or League in that particular area that a true picture of what would happen if Britain really lost the war was vitally necessary as a corrective to such an attitude.

The Bulletin was also intended to form the basis of speakers’ notes, when talks were arranged by the Committees and Home Front Leagues.

Among the subjects discussed in the Bulletins were - Is the Invasion Coming? Why Hitler Delays; Our Essential Strength; Ships and Supplies; Our Raiders over Germany; The Gestapo in Europe; Recovered Confidence; Evacuees; The Milk Shortage; The British Empire in Action: etc., etc.,

The first Bulletin was duplicated in the Regional office, but subsequent numbers were printed in Reading and forwarded very week at first and then, owing to the paper shortage, every fortnight to the Committees and Home Front Leagues, the editors of Regional newspapers, Local Authorities, and representatives of important organisations, many of whom wrote to say how interesting and informative they found them.

One of the main reasons for the publication of the Regional Bulletin was the failure of London to supply sufficient information of the kind required.

25 26

3. (c) CAMPAIGNS AND DISPLAYS.

These were originally intended as activities of Local Information Committees, but their development proceeded on such a scale as to warrant the appointment in March 1942 of a special officer for the work of organisation.

Campaigns .

The most successful campaigns were the various Recruitment and Blood Transfusion Campaigns. The latter would, however, have been enormously strengthened if the actual act of giving blood could have taken place during the run of the campaign. The tremendous publicity which ended in the signing of a promise to give blood at a subsequent date was something of an anti-climax.

Display Material .

This consisted of -

(a) Topical News Screens and Photographs - a weekly display which was quite the most popular, demand always exceeding supply. There were many confusions concerning the supply of screens and changes of policy in this connection.

(b) Picture Set Scheme . This, too, proved very popular, and the loan library which operated with the used material was greatly appreciated.

(c) National Scheme for Propaganda by Window Display . This was short lived and not a very great success.

(d) Photogravures . These were most popular and were frequently used by a number of people after the original holder had finished with them. The majority of the sites were shop windows, especially newspaper offices’ windows.

(e) Posters. On the whole, these were never issued in sufficient quantities or in sufficient variety. Without exception the most popular proved to be the really instructive posters, such as those illustrating various countries of the Empire. Highly coloured posters of the “Back Them Up” type were appreciated. Some Security Posters were regarded as silly and overdone. Posters having a message of purely pep character or morale message were despised.

Exhibitions.

The most successful have been the Exhibitions with a large number of three dimensional exhibits. Things in the solid, objects which can be touched, worked or moved made a more successful exhibition than a number of screens bearing pictures and photographs.

The custom of allocating a fixed number of posters, press advertisements, banners, etc., to each show was a handicap when staging an Exhibition, as publicity requirements were found to vary from town to town and from month to month. It would also have been a help if the Regional Officers responsible for the arrangements could have seen the Exhibitions before they were put on the road.

The fact that most of the material was too big for anywhere but the big halls in large cities were another difficulty encountered. In future it might be as well to consider the possibility of very small Exhibition units which could be shown in country towns. The possibility of touring Exhibition vans has never really been developed by the M.O.I., although other Government Departments and Voluntary Societies have done very well with them.

Both Campaigns and Exhibitions would have been much strengthened had they been more closely tied up with the work of the Meetings Department and that of the Films Department.

The policy of showing in stores proved very successful, more so than in Art Galleries and Museums. Much more use could be made of really well known people as official openers and first-rate lecturers during the course of an Exhibition.

Pamphlets , etc.,

Pamphlets appeared in December 1939. The principle of distribution was to pass them to speakers and to the Chairmen and Secretaries of Information Committees. They were also distributed to the editors of provincial newspapers through the Press Department. The pamphlets have varied very much in quality; many have been extremely dreary, lacking in colour and illustrations. Much greater use might be made of diagrams in the presentations of statistical material.

Special Days.

Red Army Day. The most successful ever organised in this Region was held in Oxford with a number of distinguished speakers, including the then Minister, Mr. Brendan Bracken.

United Nations Day . These, too, have been popular since their inception in 1942. They were not long lived, however, and were not as popular as the efforts on behalf of the different allies treated as different individual nations.

3. (f) MEETINGS .

One of the earlier activities required of the Regional office was the organisation of meetings, and endeavours were made to organise these through the medium of the Oxford Extra- Mural Delegacy, the W.E.A., a number of Rotary Clubs, various Chambers of Commerce, Brotherhoods, Round Tables, and so on. During April 1940 forty-two meetings were held under the auspices of the Ministry, seventy-six had been arranged, and 170 projected.

In April 1940 the first Regional Meetings Officer at Reading was appointed.

Voluntary speakers were at first recruited mainly from Reading and the locality, owing to the Meetings Officer's many contacts with likely people. They went to Rotary Clubs, Round Tables, Women's Institutes, Church meetings for women and factories. Almost the only subject at this time was “Morale” - talks to combat gossip and rumour. Later the list grew and in time there were voluntary speakers in nearly all parts of the Region.

When staff speakers were sanctioned by Headquarters in the summer of 1940, seven were employed for varying periods and two or three were loaned by other Regions for occasional spells of a month or so, principally to meet demands for factory talks.

In March 1941 Surrey passed from us to the South Eastern Region, and Dorset came into the Southern Region from the South Western Region, thus making it coterminous with the Civil Defence Region. The distance of Dorset from Reading, compared with the nearness of Surrey, meant a considerable change in plans for meetings - a change that was not helped by the original Information Committee, which covered the whole of the County. It was far too unwieldy and was later split up into more workable areas.

Monthly War Commentaries by the same speaker, generally a Staff Speaker, were a distinctive feature of our work in the winters of 1942 and 1943. These were given mainly in small towns and large villages not covered by Local Information Committees and at a time when there was need for informative background talks against which hearers could put events in the various theatres of war, when they happened. This was probably the most profitable period; not spectacular, but nevertheless we had evidence that much solid work was done. Places most worthwhile, which had taken regular commentaries, later had talks on the British Empire, America, Russia, China, France, etc.,

America's entry into the war gave us a new opportunity. Officers of the U.S.A. Forces and others addressed Rotary Clubs and public meetings, and several speakers on the Regional panel who had firsthand knowledge of America and her people rendered valuable service. We also sent many speakers to U.S.A. units and hospitals.

Naturally, when Africa, Europe and the Far East blazed up, our voluntary speakers, with some notable exceptions, hadn't knowledge to give up to date talks on current events, and Headquarters supplied speakers in increasing numbers.

From April 1940 to July 1945, 63 months, the Meetings Officer had an Assistant only for 27 months - August 1941 to March 1942 and May 1942 to November 1943. With more administrative help, more could have been done - more meetings and better - but with so much to do at the office, outside work had to be reduced to a minimum. When it was possible, it brought very 27 encouraging results.

3. (g) Intelligence .

The record of the Intelligence department is somewhat involved.

The Intelligence service partly arose out of Press Intelligence reports. A reference to the Press Section indicates that Regional reports based on the trend of opinion expressed in the Regional Press were periodically forwarded to London. Later reports were called for based on public opinion as expressed by selected contacts representing cross sections of the community in all parts of the Region.

The first Intelligence contacts in the Southern Region were officers nominated by the Inland Revenue in September 1939. The Regional Commissioner also initiated a scheme whereby reliable information could be collected and co-ordinated and this material (compiled at the Regional Commissioner's Office), together with matters touched upon by M.O.I. contacts, was sent to London in the form of a fortnightly Situation Report by the D.R.I.O.-cum- Intelligence Officer pending a definite policy on the subject of Intelligence formulated by Headquarters.

On 21st May, 1940, the first of a series of short daily Reports dictated by the R.I.O. was telephoned to Home Intelligence Division. Public reactions to the German advance in Europe, demands for franker news and action against enemy aliens, the state of morale, rumours, etc., were thus brought quickly to the attention of the Government. From November onwards, however, these telephonic reports became more irregular and were interspersed with typed ones, which were mailed to London.

When the Assistant Press Officer was appointed Intelligence Officer in September 1941, he was able, by means of personal visits, to rope in some useful individual contacts. Members of the Regional staffs of other Government Departments also proved co-operative.

Owing to the suspicion of the “Cooper Snoopers” and to lack of definite instructions from London as to the status and duties of the Intelligence Officer and a refusal of Committees to play without such instructions, considerable difficulties were experienced. The Officer was not allowed to assume the title of “Intelligence Officer” and, although information was to be obtained by personal contact, the Officer had to camouflage his intentions. Reports obtained in such a way were obviously meagre, and physically the Officer could not get many reports by interview, as his calls were limited by the time taken, length of journey, and the fact that he also had inside work to do. A request then came from London that the Intelligence Officer's reports should be based on written material, and this brought matters to a head. The Intelligence Section was re-organised and its purpose made clear to L.I.Cs. and all contacts of the Ministry, and it was thus possible to set up a sound organisation. As a result, through the Emergency organisation, L.I.Cs. and personal effort, a file of over 500 contacts was speedily compiled - people who were willing to submit a report once a month on comments overheard in public. This enabled weekly reports to London to be based on an average of as many as 100 contact reports a week.

A most valuable phase of the work in the Intelligence Section came under the heading of “Action Points”. This meant taking up at a Regional level with other Ministries complaints or adverse comments that were noted in reports received from contacts. An average of 43 points per month were dealt with during 1944, and from letters of appreciation received it was obvious that the Ministry built up goodwill throughout the Region and people began to look upon the Ministry as a means of remedying many of those minor but annoying difficulties that 28 made war conditions so irritating. Other Ministries, too, became very appreciative of the fact that they were being kept informed of difficulties affecting their respective services.

When the Ministry decided to close Home Intelligence, the news was not at all favourably received by other Ministries or the general public in the Region, and the service was therefore carried on a Regional basis until the Local Information Committees and Emergency Information Officers were disbanded on June 12th, 1945.

Whilst a small minority regarded the “Questions and Answers” as of little value, by far the largest number of contacts stated that they were most useful.

3. (h) FILMS .

The working up of our Films organisation followed the normal course. On 3rd August, 1940, a Films Officer was appointed, and since then the Film Section has succeeded in carrying through the job it set out to do - to present to all types of audience, urban, rural, specialised and industrial, wherever and whenever such audiences could be got together, news, facts, views and information of the Battle Fronts and the National and Allied War Effort.

General shows to the general public - of which there were many hundreds - in addition to meeting the need for news also did a valuable morale job. The fact that shows were “Admission Free” played little part in attracting audiences, since whilst people will attend a free show once, they will only continue to attend again and again - as they did attend again and again - if the shows are worthwhile and giving the sort of thing people want to know and see. Quickly the public discriminated between M.O.I. and ordinary cinema shows. To the latter they went for entertainment, to the former for facts, news and information of the war in all its aspects. The M.O.I. film show tied up with Press and Radio in giving the visual background to much of the news.

Particularly outstanding jobs were the widely spread series of C.D. and N.F.S. training shows, for which type of work the film is the outstanding medium.

On the broad principle as to whether or not a film section ought to have its place in the scheme of things, should a similar emergency again arise, the answer is certainly in the affirmative.

Over five years of valuable experience has been gathered up and from time to time transmitted to the appropriate departments. The ideal programme length should not exceed 90 minutes. There is still room for improvement on the technical film printing and sound recording side on sub-standard film. Programmes have tended to be perhaps a little too much on the heavy side. A touch of humour here and there would have helped. On the whole, however, the material has been consistently good, as indeed it must have been repeatedly to hold audiences for over five years.

Much more could have been done, had equipment and manpower been available. Had pressure not been so heavy, more time could have been allocated to the showing of a specialised programme to specialised audiences, such as farmers, teachers and so on. A vast field for this type of constructive work remains hardly touched.

There can be little doubt that the scheme was, and continues to be, a valuable side of this Ministry's work.

29

3. (i) PRESS AND CENSORSHIP .

Although there was a considerable amount of work under the heading of Press Relations from the date on which the Regional Office was set up, it was not until the appointment of a Press Officer on 27th November, 1939, that the Press work began in earnest. We were fortunate in securing the services of an officer who was Secretary of the local N.U.J. and therefore already well known to the local Press.

A system of cuttings from newspapers published in the area was inaugurated and Summaries were circulated twice weekly (increased later to three times weekly). These cuttings and Summaries became invaluable to the Regional Commissioner and the Heads of the various Government Departments in the Region. The first Intelligence Reports prepared in the Region were based on the Press Officer's review of the newspapers of the Region.

One of the most important preoccupations of the Press Officer was to get going an emergency news distribution in case the Region was cut off from London. This was done by enlisting the help of the Regional newspapers. The Region was divided into seven zones, each with a newspaper through which news was to be distributed to other newspapers. The centre zone newspaper and the other selected newspapers would then get out what we gave them in bulletin form, and arrangements were made for the Police to put up the bulletins on the Regional Commissioner's boards. Special M.O.I. Notice Boards were considered unnecessary in this Region.

The remaining activities of the Press Department may be summarised as follows:-

Censorship Advice .

This probably meant seven or eight telephone calls a day for the sixty odd newspapers in the Region. As we had no Censorship Unit here, queries which could not be answered by commonsense or from the routine information sent us from London had to be referred telephonically to London.

Our Censorship Advice service undoubtedly did a great deal to consolidate us with the Press.

Another useful feature was “Lines from All Fronts”, a write-up of stuff sent us from London to suit local taste issued at regular intervals.

Considerable time was expended in giving advice to editors as to how to explain war restrictions, etc., etc.,

Helping newspapers to secure or retain manpower and to secure machinery and paper made steady demands upon our time, as did Press work for other Government Departments in connection with campaigns, exhibitions, grievances etc., etc.,

Newspapers frequently needed our co-operation in regard to securing alternative printing establishments, alternative P.A. lines, etc. Here also we took the initiative in order to be sure that the papers were taking full advantage of facilities offered to them. We also fought many “manpower” battles for our Press.

For “D” Day we acted in regard to traffic arrangements as representatives of the Press in seeing that the arrangements did not interfere unduly with their distributing machinery.

Press Pass Problems , from the Reporters’ Green Cards to special Permits for “D” Day, also gave us considerable work.

We were supposed to be able to warn the Press about visits of Royalties and other notabilities, but often, owing to the inability of London to warn us, we were unable to do this, and then we had to act as best we could as a buffer between an irritated Press and the appropriate Authorities in London.

The Press Department spent a considerable amount of its time reading the local Press, partly in order to adapt its hand-outs to local taste, partly to report to the scrutiny section of censorship, and partly in order to prepare the Press Summary which went out three times a week to 30 the Government Departments in the Region and was found to be most useful to them, for obvious reasons.

It should be added that for local reasons we were unable to use voluntary workers for our Press Summary and Press cutting work.

The Press Department also placed the advertisements for our M.O.I. Films.

3. (j) POST BLITZ AND EMERGENCY ORGANISATION .

This really arose out of the activities of the Local Information Committee each of which was supposed to have a Sub- Committee to act in case of emergency. Conferences with the Regional Commissioner and other Government Departments after air-raids soon made it apparent that something of a more definite character, working in close liaison with the Local Authority and Police, was necessary, and early in 1941 it was decided to appoint an Emergency Information Officer for every town with a population of 5,000 and upwards. At first there was some trouble with our Local Information Committees, as the latter found it difficult to realise that E.I.Os were to work with Civil Defence independently of them. The R.I.O. sat on the more important emergency organisation committees convened by the Regional Commissioner, e.g. the Portsmouth Fortress Committee.

The appointment of Emergency Information Officers hung fire for a time, but with the appointment of an additional officer in 1942 a special effort was made and the value of the scheme was pointed out to Local Authorities. They were told that an Emergency Information Officer could only be appointed after consultation with and with the approval of the appropriate Local Authority. This allayed their suspicion and reluctance to play.

Altogether eighty-one Emergency Information Officers, working under six County Emergency Officers, were appointed, and almost without exception the organisation worked harmoniously with the Local Authorities; in fact many of the E.I.Os. were either members of or officials of the Local Authorities.

A Handbook outlining their duties was prepared for E.I.Os. , and over 500 voluntary drivers, announcers and messengers were enrolled in the Region to work under these officers.

Ultimately, the E.I.O. system was broken down to village Invasion Committees, the respective Chairmen of the village Invasion Committees acting as representatives of the E.I.O. of the nearest main centre of population. Thus the whole Region was assured of an Emergency Information Officer service. Volunteers were kept interested by occasional Exercises, and when the Intelligence organisation was extended to embrace E.I.Os. and their representatives, this further stimulated interest.

The E.I.O. system was originally planned to deal with post blitz work, then swung over to anti-invasion measures, and finally aimed at coping with potential blitzes prior to and on D-Day.

In invasion work it was decided to rely primarily upon loud-speaker cars, and at one time there were over 90 such cars in the Region. The closest liaison was arranged with the police to deal with potential refugees on the road, should there be heavy bombing of invasion bases, and experience in a large number of exercises, large and small, showed that the system would have worked effectively. We had no panels of special car drivers, apart from those allowed for the 90 loud-speaker cars in the Region. This was largely because we made exhaustive 31 arrangements with local bill-posting companies and cinemas for the exhibition of invasion posters and because the police, as already stated, were to be responsible for the posting of all emergency news bulletins.

Reports of air-raid emergency work at Southampton, Weymouth, Portsmouth and Cowes, together with notes of conferences and recommendations, are attached hereto as APPENDIX A.

32

THE CHANNEL ISLANDS .

The Channel Islands were added to the Southern Region in May 1945. By instruction of the Minister, the D.R.I.O. was sent to the Islands on May 29th to ascertain the needs of the Islanders for the services of the Ministry of Information and to report on the possibility of setting up a temporary office in Jersey or Guernsey.

The report was submitted in due course and, following a conference under the Chairmanship of the D.D.G., a scheme of service was approved. Thanks to the experience gained in the rest of the Region, the opportunity presented itself for a model scheme, i.e., eliminating L.I.Cs. and a duplication of contacts. The States officials were approached in the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey and the suggestion made that they should nominate someone to be an official Honorary representative of the Ministry for the respective Islands, so that all activities could be canalised through one person who would have the confidence and approval of the States, in this way assuring official encouragement of all the Ministry's activities. Two excellent men were nominated and both received from the D.D.G. a letter of appointment as Honorary representatives of the Ministry.

The first activity was to send a mobile film unit to tour the Islands of Jersey, Guernsey and Sark. All available literature, posters, photographs, etc., covering every phase of the war were despatched to the Islands and were distributed through the two honorary representatives acting in the closest collaboration with the States librarians. So much was this appreciated that at St. Helier a special fortnight’s exhibition of war photographs was arranged in the Church House. Headquarters’ speakers followed and the one touring Jersey, Mt. Harold Gibson, must have had an experience unique for M.O.I. speakers. Speaking at the Town Hall in St. Helier, he found that the Town Hall was linked by a loud-speaker relay system throughout the Island, so that he had probably the widest and certainly the most scattered audience addressed by an M.O.I. speaker.

Every effort was made to compensate for the gap in information caused by the occupation of the Islands by German troops. Within a fortnight of the word “Go” the Islands were receiving the same M.O.I. service as the rest of the Region.

The Islanders proved very appreciative, and the States officials have expressed their gratitude for the service of the Ministry of Information.

33

APPENDIX A

Ministry of information,

(Southern Region)

9th December, 1940.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
AIR RAID EMERGENCY WORK

34 - 2 - 36 - 4 -

SOUTHAMPTON

There have been three really bad raids on Southampton, the first during the last hours of Saturday, November 23rd, the second and third at the same time on November 30th and December 1st.

DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES

These three have left Southampton worse damaged than Coventry, according to journalists and others who have visited both places.

Casualties were, however, relatively small. They total about 370, of which probably half were fatal. This was due partly to the large proportion of incendiary bombs used, especially on November 30th, and to the fact that there are comparatively few residents in the business part of the town and around the Civic Centre, where the attack was particularly intense. Also a long apprenticeship to raiding has made the population shelter-conscious. Last Saturday (December 7th), when a repetition of the raiding was apprehended, the streets were deserted after dark.

If the centre of the town is more damaged than the centre of Coventry, some of the outer erections of the town are in a worse plight than the West End of London. Parts of the industrial suburbs, such as Woolston are indeed, almost as badly hit as the centre of the town. The greater part of the damage was due to fire, and the excellence of the fire-fighting service stresses the fact that a concentrated attack by incendiary bombs presents a problem which has yet to be solved. Of that problem the water supply is the most formidable ingredient. Another thing that hampered the Southampton fire-service was the sudden discovery that the junctions of pipes brought in from outside did not always fit local ones.

Damage to important industries was surprisingly small.

THE SERVICES

The services were all affected but in varying degree. The telephone entirely knocked out; the electricity services were only partially compromised; the water supply was badly hit, and, though important repairs were quickly made, portions of the community are still completely without running water or lack an adequate supply; the gas works were seriously damaged and transport was inevitably dislocated; and the municipal offices at the Civic Centre were rendered well-nigh untenable. The worst disability imposed upon those in authority, however, came from the break-down of communication. For some time after the second and third raids contacts were largely a matter of chance.

THE POPULATION

The population was shaken but undismayed. There was no panic or looting. There was considerable evacuation, partly official but mainly spontaneous. The ‘trek’ to the country was pathetic to see, and the quarters found were often inadequate. But it was not a panic movement. Men went mainly to escort their women-folk, and the women often on account of their children. The large majority of the workers were anxious to return by day for their work. With very few exceptions, the personnel of the different services met the emergency effectively. The same cannot be said of all the chief municipal officers. There were cases when good intentions did not produce equally good results.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

The Regional Commissioner arrived at Southampton early on each Sunday. On both occasions he called a conference morning and afternoon of the appropriate officials. On the first Sunday those conferences were attended by the R.I.O. and on the second Sunday the D.R.I.O. was there as well.

On the first Sunday the R.I.O. did not have much to do, except to manage the press and keep in touch with Reading and London. It was not then considered necessary to use loudspeakers or to introduce other emergency measures.

On the second Sunday it was evident that emergency measures would have to be brought into action, and this was still more the case on the Monday (December 2nd). Our activities can be summarised as follows:

PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT

(1) On arriving on December 1st, the R.I.O. and D.R.I.O. attended the meeting held by the Regional Commissioner of the local officials. After this meeting, a report was drafted by the Regional Commissioner to the Ministry of Home Security in such a way as to ensure the right sort of official bulletin. The press was given the same “ slant”.

(2) Help to local press : The office of the Southampton Daily Echo was pulverised, and the staff proceeded to Bournemouth to bring out the paper in the office of a sister newspaper.

We were able (a) to arrange with the Ministry of Transport for extra petrol for the Echo's delivery vans, (b) to get extra coupons for numbers of the staff to go backwards and forwards from their homes,(o) through Headquarters, to help the Echo continue its P.A. service.

The Echo's emergency arrangements have worked well. It did not miss its Southampton sales a single day.

The national newspapers were also on sale in Southampton all through.

(3) National and Foreign Press . Help of the usual sort was afforded the representatives of the national and foreign press, personally conducted tours, guidance, interviews, etc., etc.

(4) Posters and Notices . We assisted in the preparation of notices issued by the Regional Commissioner, the Mayor, etc. Of these, there were two (a) a proclamation, signed by the Regional Commissioner and the Mayor, asking refugee workers in the country to return to work,(b) a poster giving a time-table of buses and trains for the journey to and fro.

These posters were distributed over a wide rural area and in the appropriate towns by members of the Reading staff using their own cars, by one of our film unit cars and its driver, and by the Home Front Leagues of the New Forest and Winchester and neighbourhood, and, of course, members of the appropriate Local Information Committees.

(5) We also used four loudspeaker vans in this area, in which members of the Reading staff, the Secretary of the New Forest Home Front League and L.I.C., and Mr. Rose of the Southampton L.I.C. were the speakers.

LOCAL INFORMATION COMMITTEES AND HOME FRONT LEAGUES

The Southampton L.I.C. did not function during the emergency. The reason for this is obvious; members, with one exception, whose help would have been useful, were engrossed in the emergency duties which fell to them as members of the community. This perhaps, reveals an 35 - 3 -inevitable weakness of L.I.Cs. in similar circumstances. The member of the Southampton L.I.C. who did function was Mr. Rose. Mr. Rose is the local Labour agent, a member of the A.R.P. Committee and of our Regional Advisory Committee. The value of his assistance to us and, indeed, to the Regional Commissioner's organisation cannot be exaggerated.

The Southampton Home Front League did not function. Its Secretary has become soured by the long delay that there has been in supplying him with promised assistance. This was unfortunate, as it is to the wider Home Front League organisation rather than to the L.I.C. to whom it would appear that we shall have to look for help after intensive air-raiding. The membership of the Home Front Leagues is large enough and broad enough (unlike that of L.I.Cs.) to afford us what ought, with a little organisation, to be useful allies and points of contact.

One thing, in any case, the incident has brought out, namely, that the neighbouring Ministry organisations have a useful role to perform when a centre is badly raided. The Secretaries of our organisations for the New Forest and Winchester and neighbourhood immediately reported. The former, as said above, himself manned a loudspeaker van, and both used part of the Home Front League membership in getting out posters and helping us to reach the refugees.

There is scope for a further organisation of this work.

ASSISTANCE TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

We acted and are acting as public relations officer to the Regional Commissioner and to his Deputy, whom the Regional Commissioner left as his representative for as long as the crisis might continue at Southampton. Mr. Gammons spent the greater part of the last week in Southampton, and, thanks to his energy and local knowledge, was on more than one occasion able to be of use to Mr. Bernays in public relations matters. Thus, when trouble with Labour threatened, he called in Mr. Rose, who quelled the rising storm and removed its causes. Mr. Rose has now, in addition to his other duties, taken on that of local Labour adviser to the Regional Commissioner's office.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

It was not necessary for us to exercise all the emergency functions which might fall to us. The uninterrupted arrival of the national and local newspapers, and the fact that the electrical services, and therefore the B.B.C., were not for long comprehensively deranged, rendered an emergency bulletin unnecessary.

Nor did we do all the loudspeaker work that might have fallen to us, as the local police cars dealt with the boiling of drinking water and milk, the necessity of conserving water, etc. The municipal authorities also undertook the posting of notices about the location of emergency Departments, etc.

On the whole, our activities during the Southampton incident were much what we expected them to be. Valuable lessons have, however, emerged from our experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions may be roughly summarised as follows:

(1) It is essential to be prepared for a complete breakdown of communications with the outside world and even as between different parts of and activities in the afflicted area. One must, in fact, be prepared for a situation in which none of the ordinary aids to work are forthcoming.

(2) The Ministry's representative must work even more closely with the Regional Commissioner than at the Regional capital. He must not only deal with the press on behalf of the Ministry of Information; he must act as the press officer of the Regional Commissioner, of the other Government Departments, and quite possibly of the City Departments. His duties as public relations officer of the Regional Commissioner also promise to become important.

(3) The appointment of a local journalist (the editor of the weekly paper) as press liaison officer with the local A.R.P. Control is useful, especially at first. During the early days the services of this officer were most useful in establishing connections and in helping to deal with the visiting press.

(4) The Reading office must have in readiness a more elaborate organisation for “blitz” emergencies than we had contemplated.

(5) As part of this organisation, the control of an adequate number of loudspeakers and the cars for them is essential.

We relied, by previous arrangement, upon the Regional Police pool of loudspeaker cars on this occasion. The arrangement was not satisfactory. The police service was tardy and inadequate, and our work among the refugees was hampered thereby.

(6) Local Information Committees in the raid area and their personnel are not likely to be of much use to us.

(7) The Home Front Leagues, with their larger and more widely spread membership, might, on the other hand, be extremely useful.

(8) Neighbouring L.I.Cs. and Home Front Leagues can have a valuable part in our scheme.

The procedure which it seems advisable to follow in the event of other serious air-raiding in the light of the lessons learnt at Southampton is dealt with in a separate report.

37

HOME MORALE REPORT
PORTSMOUTH AIR RAID

Ministry of Information,

(Southern Region)

16th January, 1941

Portsmouth was heavily raided on the night of January 10th. At first sight it looked as if the damage done was less severe than that at Southampton. A more detailed inspection, however, changed that impression. One realised that probably just as much damage had been done to houses and streets as in Southampton. The difference was that Portsmouth is more than twice as large as Southampton and that the damage was more scattered. The Portsmouth Guildhall, on the other hand, was completely gutted as a result of incendiary bombs, whereas the Civic Centre at Southampton, though damaged, was left to some extent usable.

The morale in Portsmouth was excellent, and, if the size of the trek of refugees to the country is any criterion, better than Southampton. The firmness of morale is attributed to the way in which the population is stiffened by a large admixture of the fighting services and also to the stimulating effect of an exceptionally large number of soldiers and sailors doing demolition work, etc. In this connection it may be noted that French prestige was given a much needed “boosting” by the presence of working parties from the French Navy, who, from all accounts, did extremely well.

The Head of the local Labour Exchange told me on my last visit to Portsmouth on January 14th that he had been tremendously impressed by the spirit of a large number of women who had been bombed out of their employment at various corset factories. He said that they were the happiest crowd of unemployed he had ever seen, in spite of the fact that many of them had lost their houses.

Morale was helped by the fact that there was no repetition of the raid on the night of the 11th. During the 10th there had been a fairly heavy exodus to the country owing to the expectation of a second attack. During the afternoon, indeed, the one roadway out of Portsmouth was crowded with refugees on foot and in every form of conveyance from baby carriages to heavy lorries. The fact, however, that there is only one road out of Portsmouth rendered the spectacle delusive as an indication of mass evacuation. According to figures given at a meeting of the L.I.C. on January 15th, there were, in point of fact, about 2,000 official evacuees scattered around neighbouring towns like Petersfield and Fareham and in the smaller places many more people were, of course, sleeping out of town, a practice which to some extent has been indulged in ever since the earlier raids.

In the town four of the ten Rest Centres had been closed by Tuesday, the 14th, and it was expected that more would shortly be dispensed with. Also it seemed that a proportion of their occupants were not would-be evacuees but people who had been bombed out of their houses and were waiting to see if they could get alternative accommodation.

The quietness with which the raid was taken, together with the fact that the local newspaper was not bombed out, decided the local authorities not to issue, or ask us to issue, special bulletins, or loudspeaker news. Official loud-speaker work regarding the boiling of milk and water, location of Rest Centres, emergency ration cards, etc., etc., were left to the Police, to whom we turned over our six Ministry of Information loudspeaker oars on the understanding that, if we wanted any or all of them back, we could have them at once.

As will be seen from the report of the L.I.C. meeting of January 14th, the solidity of the Portsmouth home front was slightly compromised by patches of defeatism of the type which asks “Why go on? This is a hopeless business. We hit the other fellow, and he hits us, and neither gets anywhere”. It was stated that this kind of talk could be heard in 38 - 2 -the dockyard as well as in the streets. It was also stated by the two representatives of the Conservative Party at the L.I.C. that the Communists and other subversive elements were doing their best to exploit it. Nothing, however, was ascertainable which would indicate that defeatism of this sort exists in anything more than small, isolated pockets. It is believed at Portsmouth, as at Southampton, that the majority of its victims are probably women.

A much more significant symptom of the prevalent spirit was to my mind afforded by our L.I.C., the membership of which settled down to discuss our emergency arrangements for the next blitz, the inevitability of which they took for granted with complete equanimity. The same spirit characterises the local authority, the stalwart efficiency of which is another factor on the side of good morale.

The L.I.C. voiced a rather prevalent complaint that those responsible for the first anonymous bulletin of the raid early on the morning after it, had let Portsmouth down pretty badly by the light-hearted way in which they dealt with what they ought to have known even then was a first-class raid. It was strongly pointed out that the fuller details that can be given after a raid, the better the effect upon local morale. Great stress, of course, was laid upon giving the name of the Towns as quickly as possible.

The L.I.C. stressed the fact that there was a certain restlessness in the town about the destruction of the Guildhall. People, it was said, were wondering how the Council could convincingly ask shopkeepers and householders to guard their own property when it had obviously failed, according to common gossip, to guard its own property. The Committee, indeed decided that unless the Council issued a statement on the matter, it would ask the War Emergency Committee for a statement which, if not published in the press, could at any rate be disseminated orally through the town by the Home Front League.

The chief lessons provided by this incident regarding public morale seem to be

(1) that one cannot have too many loudspeaker cars giving official announcements and directions;

(2) that about the most important of these announcements and directions concerns the addresses of Information Bureaux and the addresses of Rest Centres;

(3) that the addresses of the Food Office, Communal Kitchens, bakeries and food shops also need a maximum of continuous broadcasting.

39

COPY
SECRET
COWES AIR RAID - NIGHT MAY 4th - 5th

The Deputy Regional Commissioner (Mr. Asbury) ordered a post-blitz conference at Northbrook House, Cowes, at 12.30 hours May 5th. This information was not issued by Regional Headquarters until 9.07 hours. Osman and Ede left by road at 9.45 a.m. to make the rendezvous at Portsmouth Fire Station at 11.15. There the N.F.S. was detailed to check in the party and transport them by launch to the Isle of Wight.

Most of the post-blitz conference party made the rendezvous on time except the Deputy Regional Commissioner and his officers. The party waited at Portsmouth Fire Station until after noon when there was still no news of the Regional Headquarters staff and the party moved off without them.

It was by this time impossible to arrive in Cowes for the 1230 conference. The launch had to put in at Ryde in compliance with shipping restrictions at Cowes. At Ryde a motorbus took the party to West Cowes. Just before the bus reached the town, it met the Deputy Commissioner's car leaving Cowes and one of his officers informed the party that the conference would be held at Newport at 3.15. That meant an almost immediate turn-round and return to Newport but it was agreed that the last quarter of a mile to Cowes should be covered in the hope that there would be time for the party to get into touch with the various officials on the spot.

Road diversions, however, delayed the journey and as it was impossible to drive into the town itself because of the damage and of unexploded bombs, the party had to leave the bus on the outskirts. Only ten minutes could he allowed for the members of the party to see the town before the bus had to start on its journey back to Newport.

Thus at the conference, which was held at the County Hall, none of the Reading people had any first-hand knowledge. The following facts were learned from local officials:

The greater part of the damage was to industrial property, although there was a considerable amount of civilian damage. Four factories were destroyed and 20 others damaged, between 4000 and 5000 workers being affected. It was expected however that many of them would be able to do some sort of work and others would be set to work on demolition and repair. The canteens at White's and Saunders-Roe were both destroyed and 2500 mid-day meals would be needed the following day.

A rough estimate of the casualties was given as 51 killed and 180 injured.

All A.R.P. services were fully extended and a great deal of help was given by the military. This included the service of a field ambulance unit. Royal Engineers undertook demolition work.

Houses damaged numbered between 200 and 300 and between 500 and 600 homeless were dealt with at six rest centres and billeted before the end of the day.

No food stocks were damaged and it was stated that the feeding facilities were adequate, including the supply of meals to the factories.

Water supplies to domestic consumers were partially affected, but the drought had depleted the reservoirs and sea water would be used.

Electricity supplies were interrupted and this in turn affected the gas supply at West Cowes which depends upon electricity for feeding operations and the supply was reduced to one tenth. The West Cowes 40 - 2 -system had about twelve fractures which were under repair but a call was made for 12 military to do manual stoking until civilian labour could be recruited. The Last Cowes gas position was worse.

Communications position was bad following serious damage to the exchange. At the time of the conference 12 subscribers were connected but there was only one doubtful line to the mainland (to Southampton) and that failed later. The industrial people urged the quick restoration of the air-raid warning system at the principal factories which, it was felt, would help towards the return of the workpeople.

Roads were reasonably clear although there were a number of diversions because of unexploded bombs. Railways continued their normal service until later in the day when there were suspensions for the same reason and supplementary road transport had to be arranged.

As to the emergency information service, the resources of the local Urban District Council seemed to have been sufficient. An Information Centre (which M.O.I. representatives visited for a few minutes) was opened at Northbrook House and was reasonably well used. The necessary information for bombed people was available at the rest centres and there appeared to be no evidence of people lacking information and direction. The police superintendent stated that he had two loudspeaker cars but he did not find it necessary to use them.

The offer of the loudspeaker vans which we had ordered to stand by at Portsmouth and Southampton was not accepted and no reason why it should have been accepted was apparent.

It was unnecessary for M.O.I. representatives to stay and they returned to headquarters the same night. Several representatives of the departments concerned with communications and industrial restoration remained.

7th May, 1942.

41

COPY
Weymouth Air Raid, April 2-3

GDHO/ADW/F.12/27

To: Home Division

From: D.R.I.O., Southern Region No.6

With reference to your minute HP.730/6 of the 11th instant regarding the lack of co-operation between the local controller and our Emergency Information Officer.

As I mentioned in my minute to you of the 13th instant we had already made representations to Regional Headquarters on this matter, and I saw the Senior Regional Officer immediately on his return from Weymouth where he had been conducting a local inquiry into the working of the Controller.

It is quite clear that Regional Headquarters are very dissatisfied with the Controller's present arrangements and method of working and are taking up the matter very strongly with him.

The trouble appears to be that the Controller kept matters very much in his own hands and would not delegate work to other officials which resulted in unsatisfactory reports and a great lack of contact with other Departments, and their local officials. I understand Regional Headquarters are now insisting on the appointment of a Deputy Controller who will be in charge of the Intelligence side of the Report Centre so that information will be available to such officials and representatives of other Departments who are fully entitled to be conversant with the situation. They are specially noting to the Controller that close contact should be maintained with our Emergency Information Officer.

I explained to the Senior Regional Officer the results of our not having up-to-date information particularly in regard to the damage to the “Dorset Daily Echo's” plant, and stressed that in future if it is necessary to bring into operation any skeleton telephone service, it is essential that our E.I.Os. ‘phones should be maintained.

I trust that as a result of the action being taken by Regional Headquarters there will be complete co-operation between the Controller and our E.I.O., which should exist in future.

With regard to Captain F.W. King, our Weymouth Emergency Information Officer, we are not altogether satisfied with him as our E.I.O. as he is not particularly popular locally and is inclined to be tactless and throw his weight about. We may have to make a change but at the moment there is nobody suitable locally to nominate in his place and we are therefore for the time being carrying on with him.

17th April, 1942.

We use cookies to track usage and preferences.

Privacy & Cookie Policy Accept & Close