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THE M.O.I. AND THE PRESS
THE EMERGENCY NEWS SERVICES

One of the early difficulties in our relations with the Press was the irritation felt by many editors who were overwhelmed by the mass of literary matter, devoid of direct local interest, which was reaching them direct from Government Departments and other organisations in London. Without exception this was the principal complaint when, late in 1939, we visited editors to find out what they thought about this method of news dissemination. Editors were invited to collect specimens of the press matter they were receiving and which had no place in an average issue of their paper.

Eventually this direct flood was diverted and the issue of official news was carried out on a selective basis in a service from the Regional Office.

In the beginning the Ministry was faced with frank hostility because of the general misconception as to its propagandist role. It therefore became necessary to see that all Press matter sent to local newspapers should either have some direct local significance or outstanding general news value. When the local application was not clearly obvious from the text, especially when security considerations were involved, editors were provided with confidential supplementary information. Editors were quick to appreciate this course, and they in turn gradually began to approach the Regional Office for factual information, for confirmation of rumours, and for facilities to describe such war activities as were affected by security rulings.

This service developed into the provision of advice to Editors on censorship problems. By March, 1940, the Press Officer attended a special and intensive censorship course at London Headquarters. Regional Press Officers were not at this stage authorised to censor Press matter, but gradually, with the development of the air war, regional newspapers found it increasingly difficult to rely on the postal or train services which they were using in submitting news to the Censorship in London, and as a last alternative they would seek the Regional Press Officer's advice as to whether facts could safely be published. This was still theoretically consistent with the principle of voluntary censorship, although it did not safeguard editors from the possibility of prosecution if the Defence Regulations were in fact broken. Nevertheless, the practice worked smoothly, and it strengthened the association and good understanding between Press and Censorship.

A teleprinter service was finally provided between the Regional Office and London, and the Regional Press Officer, as Censorship Adviser, was able to ‘refer’ submissions which were outside the scope of his authority and obtain a ruling from London which was covered by the authority of the Censor's stamp.

Amongst the activities of the Press Department were a host of occasions which came under the general heading of ‘Facilities’. They ranged from organised visits to the London blitzed areas for regional newspaper editors to the inspection by London leader-writers of maternity homes; from broadcasts from bombed Norwich to Christmas Eve jollifications for U.S. troops in Cambridge. Perhaps some of the most vivid broadcast impressions of the East Anglian Coast at war, were those of Norman Corwin, of the Columbia Broadcasting System, with whom this office collaborated. Editors were shown the secrets of the war in factories, docks and airfields. Apart from Press arrangements for Royal visits, there were those for distinguished generals - Eisenhower, Montgomery, Doolittle and others. The range of inquiries of a miscellaneous nature which had to be dealt with in one way or another, was enormous.

The Situation Now,

And in the Future.

During the war approximately 100 local newspapers were published in the Eastern Region from some 65 printing offices. Political policies were subordinated to the national cause. The greatest change towards the end of hostilities was that political allegiances were revived. The tendency became a conservative one, but more newspapers than previously began to adopt an independent line. Relatively few are whole-hearted supporters of the present Government. The attitude of the Press, therefore, towards the Government became watchful and inclined to be critical. This was accentuated by paper rationing. Government advertising, instead of smoothing the way towards co-operation, to some extent made matters more difficult.

The situation today is that the majority of Regional Government Departments have, as before, no Press liaison officers, and many topics are discussed in the Press which cry out for explanatory statements from Regional Headquarters of the Department involved. These Regional Departments are unaccustomed to dealing with the Press themselves and officials are often so busy with routine responsibilities that they are unable to search out facts which the Press might publish.

In the future, the Central Office of Information will need the co-operation of the local Press again, as in wartime, in conducting the many Government campaigns in prospect. When the newsprint situation improves, the path would be partly smoothed. But our position would be very much stronger if we could create well in advance a new record of accurate service to the newspapers in getting facts from Regional Government Departments whenever the Press made specific enquiries. The Press would have to understand that it would be no part of the Regional Central Office of Information to take part in purely Press enterprises and that our role would be confined to approaching a Government Department for a plain statement of fact. Furthermore, the Central Office of Information should not allow itself to be involved in direct controversy or intervention in a matter which is taking a reasonably normal course, e.g., a communication from a local Government Authority to a Regional Office should neither be a subject of intervention nor the reply be anticipated before the Local Authority receives it.

Emergency News Services

Anticipating a situation in which newspapers and the public might be cut off from normal sources of authoritative news, plans were made to issue from the Regional Office any important official statements, or other facts likely to be of value in keeping the public well informed and sound in morale. A number of leading provincial newspapers were selected to take part in a relay service, and to each was attached a satellite group of about eight other smaller journals. Each group leader was to keep in touch with its adjoining group leader, so that if communication from Regional Headquarters were to fail in one direction, it might be possible to restore the service by taking an alternative route.

This scheme was never used in the circumstances envisaged, but it proved of help at other times when it was necessary to send out important news shortly before publication time or to warn newspapers of censorship ‘stops’ which were likely to affect them immediately. The customary safeguards were taken to indicate that the information sent to the newspaper was ‘official’, and that the messages were being given only to an authorised person.

This service was a different thing entirely from the Emergency Public Information Service. This was intended for use principally in the event of a German invasion or if heavy bombing were to bring about a complete breakdown of wireless broadcasts. This service was eventually entrusted to the Police who were to supply local news secretaries with bulletins, using a relay scheme. This system was tried out in many exercises, but it, too, was not called upon to function in the circumstances for which it was planned.

Public notice boards were used from time to time as display points for Regional Commissioners’ instructions and other semi-confidential information special to the Defence Area and to the Restricted Areas within it. They were 214 - 16 -of particular value in giving localised publicity to evacuation instructions and of local restrictions which for security reasons could not be published in the newspapers.

A third method used in the service of emergency information, the object of which was mainly the checking of unfounded rumours, was the dispatch of confidential letters to persons in key positions, giving either the facts, or some indication of the facts, of a happening (e.g. a bombing incident). This enabled them to contradict exaggerated statements in their locality. This service was of special value after heavy raids, notably during the attacks in London, when provincials were apt to hear of exaggerated casualty figures or of damage to vital establishments.

The ‘E.I.Os’

The post-raid local service operated by Emergency Information Officers was yet another Scheme which proved of great value. The majority of them were not called upon to function, but participated regularly in numerous Civil Defence and military anti-invasion exercises. Group E.I.Os were appointed to control, say, half-a-dozen Emergency Officers. They were encouraged to visit their team at regular intervals, and to discuss difficulties with the E.I.O. on the spot. The arrangements were kept flexible; for example, E.I.Os were given to understand that the location of loud-speaker cars must change with circumstances, (There was a strong tendency for E.I.Os to regard cars almost as their personal property, and they would sometimes resist strongly any proposal to move a car from one area to another which might now be threatened with attack. ) This attitude was understandable for many E.I.Os went to a great deal of trouble to ensure that their cars were ready for action and had arranged for systematic servicing and garaging close to their home or office.

As the air war developed, and the threat of invasion increased, cars had to be moved fairly frequently into prospective danger areas. At the same time we tried to avoid placing cars in any area likely to be overrun by an invader. In some instances the more distant areas had to be ‘shadowed’ from some inland centre.

A further phase came when the Allies prepared for our invasion of the Continent, Extra precautions had to be taken to ‘cover+’ those ports which might be attacked as a reprisal. An area of special difficulty was the narrow strip of Essex on the north bank of the Thames. It had already experienced much bombing and was now being used as a reservoir for invasion troops. Transport vessels were anchored near at hand. Careful plans were made, and exercises arranged, to enable all non-essential civilians to be evacuated from the district within a time limit of twelve hours. This involved announcements by means of loud speakers and the distribution of leaflets.

The final test in the E.I.O. Service came with the destructive V-weapons. In Essex, the E.I.Os went into action following almost every incident. This was a period of great strain for all concerned, and one cannot speak too highly of the determination and zeal with which these volunteers went about their work.

It was always difficult to maintain interest and enthusiasm amongst those E.I.Os in the less troubled areas. It would have been a good thing if these Officers could have had some additional Civil Defence responsibility - for example, carrying out duties at a report centre, but being freed to carry out their E.I.O. duties in a crisis. At Luton, the Emergency Service was mainly a Police responsibility, and loud-speaker cars and personnel were used for emergency police duties.