This really arose out of the activities of the Local Information Committee each of which was supposed to have a Sub- Committee to act in case of emergency. Conferences with the Regional Commissioner and other Government Departments after air-raids soon made it apparent that something of a more definite character, working in close liaison with the Local Authority and Police, was necessary, and early in 1941 it was decided to appoint an Emergency Information Officer for every town with a population of 5,000 and upwards. At first there was some trouble with our Local Information Committees, as the latter found it difficult to realise that E.I.Os were to work with Civil Defence independently of them. The R.I.O. sat on the more important emergency organisation committees convened by the Regional Commissioner, e.g. the Portsmouth Fortress Committee.
The appointment of Emergency Information Officers hung fire for a time, but with the appointment of an additional officer in 1942 a special effort was made and the value of the scheme was pointed out to Local Authorities. They were told that an Emergency Information Officer could only be appointed after consultation with and with the approval of the appropriate Local Authority. This allayed their suspicion and reluctance to play.
Altogether eighty-one Emergency Information Officers, working under six County Emergency Officers, were appointed, and almost without exception the organisation worked harmoniously with the Local Authorities; in fact many of the E.I.Os. were either members of or officials of the Local Authorities.
A Handbook outlining their duties was prepared for E.I.Os. , and over 500 voluntary drivers, announcers and messengers were enrolled in the Region to work under these officers.
Ultimately, the E.I.O. system was broken down to village Invasion Committees, the respective Chairmen of the village Invasion Committees acting as representatives of the E.I.O. of the nearest main centre of population. Thus the whole Region was assured of an Emergency Information Officer service. Volunteers were kept interested by occasional Exercises, and when the Intelligence organisation was extended to embrace E.I.Os. and their representatives, this further stimulated interest.
The E.I.O. system was originally planned to deal with post blitz work, then swung over to anti-invasion measures, and finally aimed at coping with potential blitzes prior to and on D-Day.
In invasion work it was decided to rely primarily upon loud-speaker cars, and at one time there were over 90 such cars in the Region. The closest liaison was arranged with the police to deal with potential refugees on the road, should there be heavy bombing of invasion bases, and experience in a large number of exercises, large and small, showed that the system would have worked effectively. We had no panels of special car drivers, apart from those allowed for the 90 loud-speaker cars in the Region. This was largely because we made exhaustive
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arrangements with local bill-posting companies and cinemas for the exhibition of invasion posters and because the police, as already stated, were to be responsible for the posting of all emergency news bulletins.
Reports of air-raid emergency work at Southampton, Weymouth, Portsmouth and Cowes, together with notes of conferences and recommendations, are attached hereto as APPENDIX A.
