CHAPTER 2
WHEN THE RAIDS CAME

Writing now it is difficult to recapture the tense atmosphere of those stirring days, crowded with hard work, thrills, and not a little sadness, that marked the Ministry's work during and after the enemy air attacks on Northern Ireland's capital city, Belfast, in the early months of 1941. The great city of Belfast, with its massive shipyards and fine harbour facilities, was the last of the United Kingdom ports to be made the target for the Luftwaffe. But when the blow came, although there were only two major attacks, the people of Belfast suffered as heavily as any of their comrades in the United Kingdom and their difficulties were heightened by the fact that their city presented a concentrated target, with the shipyards, the aircraft factory and the main power station all situated at the tip of a strip of Lough that at night-time, in the moonlight, was like a silver pointer to the heart of a city that was throbbing by day and night with war industry. But the Northern Ireland people did not claim that they suffered worse than their fellow-citizens in Merseyside, Hull, Southampton, or in the blitzed cities of the Midlands. They regarded themselves as lucky that the enemy’s attacks were not sustained, as there was more than a little nervousness after the first heavy raid on April 15th, 1941, that a sustained effort then would have presented the authorities with a state of affairs difficult to overcome with the commendable rapidity with which the effects of the first raid were surmounted.

We did not have long respite, however, and suffered a heavy raid on the night of May 4th and a smaller raid on the following night, while there were intermittent visits of no consequence on several nights around this period. There was a minor raid on the 8th April which, in its way served to make the citizens realise more clearly the possibility of heavy raids and prepared them for the tests that were later to come.

Before describing the Ministry's part in the Northern Ireland authorities’ plans to meet such an emergency the reader would have a better picture of the nature of the raids and the all too familiar dislocation of general life in a wartime city by reading the references to Belfast raids in the official publication “Front Line”. This publication also records that in Belfast's main raids there were 946 killed. There were in fact about 2,000 casualties, but the number of deaths was high considering the fact that there were only two major raids. “Front Line” describing the raids, said that “On 15th April, the night of its greatest ordeal, the city had to withstand seven hours of heavy bombardment. Streets of houses and shopping centres blazed into walls of flame in which bombs exploded with a continuous rumbling crash. Whole sections of the city, far from military objectives, were laid in ruins, and an interrupted water supply left the flames free for a time to make progress unchecked. The A.R.P. and Fire Services did their varied tasks with courage. From the less affected parts of the city volunteers came in hundreds to reinforce the heavily stricken areas. Fire-fighting reinforcements, sorely needed, crossed the sea from Great Britain.

“That evening many people made their way out into the countryside for refuge. At the feeding centres 70,000 had been catered for by day, and the official Rest Centres were overflowing.

“On the 4th and 5th May the enemy again made Belfast his target. This time the visits were a good deal shorter and the weight of damage to houses and shops less. So were the casualties.”

The Ministry's general plans for raid and post-raid emergency work in this Region followed closely the lines of the regional plans in other parts of the United Kingdom, although we were fortunate here in operating alongside and in co-operation with the Northern Ireland Government and particularly the Northern Ireland Ministry of Public Security, whose work was mainly concerned with preparation for raids and more important emergencies in Northern Ireland. We were fortunate, too, in that there were only two major areas in which it was expected that there would be heavy raids, Belfast, and the Londonderry area, where there was a very large and active naval base servicing the vessels that protected the Western Approaches to Britain and the vital food and arms supplies that were maintaining here during the darkest days.

Broadly, the authorities’ first plan to deal with enemy air activity involved the creation of a central authority, into which all the vital organisations and 223 services concerned with the maintenance of civil life and essential services should be brought, and this organisation was to operate at the centre of activity. The Ministry of Information fitted into this general scheme as it was responsible for the maintenance of an accurate news service to the public through the issue of regular official communiqués; for the maintenance of a regular service through loudspeaker vehicles and press announcements to the homeless and harassed people; and for the printing of all the emergency posters to advise the civilian population on the services available to them in their difficulties.

The Ministry, with its small staff, had the continued assistance, particularly during the heavy raid periods, of volunteer workers from the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Northern Ireland Government, and many other persons offered their help in providing cars, which were fitted in advance with public address equipment. Great assistance was also received throughout the difficult period from the Boy Scouts’ Association, whose foot messenger service was a great help to the Ministry in its relations with the press and with firms who had skeleton staffs standing by to undertake all the emergency printing work necessary.

We had at that time two senior officers and it was agreed that the Regional Officer should assume responsibility for the issue of the official communiqués, prepared jointly by the Ministry of Public Security and the Royal Air Force. The second senior officer should report to the emergency headquarters of the Belfast Civil Defence Authority in order to be fully conversant with the extent of the raid, and therefore assess the need for bringing into force the Ministry's loudspeaker car service and the emergency printing service. This plan worked smoothly, as it was bound to do provided no member of the Ministry's staff became a raid casualty. Arrangements were made in advance for providing a pool of owner-driven cars and a volunteer panel of announcers.

Our other raid arrangements concerned negotiations with the newspapers for the interchange of printing and the co-operation of the newspaper managers and editors was an extremely valuable asset in maintaining an adequate news service during the raids. Events proved that the newspapers were to receive a heavy battering but although at one period two of the four Belfast newspapers were out of action every news sheet appeared every day. No newspaper office escaped the effects of bombing, but the. Belfast Telegraph, though suffering severe exterior damage always kept its presses running and the other newspapers were only temporarily prevented from printing on their own presses for a very short time. The “Whig” survived on an island site that was formerly a big shopping centre - thanks to a courageous staff of newspapermen fire-fighters.

In the emergency service there were additional cars carrying the owners’ loudspeaker equipment and we were fortunate in having a van and a car normally stationed outside Belfast and therefore dispersed. There were about half a dozen cars for the Belfast service and these were added to by the loan of mobile broadcasting vehicles from the R.U.C. These cars were normally on traffic duty and worked for the Ministry in the first heavy raid but could not do so to the same extent in the second raid as they were required on vital work in connection with unexploded bombs.

The facts above give an idea of the planned service and as the arrangements made by other departments appeared to us to be as perfect as possible we expected the general organisation to work successfully. The authorities were embarrassed slightly by the response of the Belfast people to the official evacuation scheme and this left in what was described as the main target area - the surroundings of dockland - a large population of people who were regarded officially as potential casualties. The effect of this not too good response to the Government's appeal for evacuation later emphasised the enormous evacuation problem facing the authorities after the first raid, and it was unfortunate that the Region as a whole outside of Belfast did not have the total accommodation to handle so vast a number of evacuees who later sought refuge outside the city. Accommodation was therefore strained.

When the big raids came the first lesson we learned here was the same as that learned in all cities that were subjected to enemy attack for the first time This was that however perfectly plans were laid it was largely a question of 224 improvisation and the final test of the efficiency of a service was its powers of adaptability.

Incidents stand out to make a permanent record in the mind of the manner in which the Regional staff had to cope with unexpected difficulties. The impression remaining after the operation of the raid services was that only unity and co-operation in a common purpose, could have overcome the problems. The raids, in fact, united people in Northern Ireland and all seemed to work together to assist in easing the difficulties that were thrust upon them.

The minor raid on April 8th did not call for the introduction of the Ministry's emergency service but a communiqué was issued, as the Ministry agreed with the authorities that whenever enemy aircraft were over Northern Ireland there should be a communiqué if there were any incidents. The Ministry's senior officers were on the scene of the first minor attack about two hours after it was delivered and had their first glimpse of the fire fighters and civil defence workers on the job. The first attack included the dropping of a parachute mine on timber premises near the docks in Belfast and when the R.I.O. and his colleague arrived on the scene a wooden store had been blown to matchwood and planks were scattered all over the immediate dockland area, lying haphazardly over minesweepers and other naval vessels in the vicinity. In a remarkably short time the place was cleared and it seemed to typify the spirit of the people when a nonchalant individual walked to the scene of the incident, got into a battered motor car half submerged in debris which was parked at a distance of about seventy yards from where the landmine fell and its parachute was still lying, and drove away through the timber as if he had been moving away from a carefully prepared parking site in a fashionable thoroughfare. This seemed to be the spirit of the people who had a part to play in meeting the enemy's attack and it proved, as was the case in England, that any person with a job to do in the raids was far happier and far less prone to nerves than the unfortunate mass of people who had just to “sit and wait for it”.

When the first big raid came our main difficulty was the issue of the Ministry's first communiqué, because this was jointly compiled by the R.A.F. and the Ministry of Public Security. At that time the Ministry of Public Security had headquarters at Stormont Castle, where the Regional Office of the Ministry of Information was established, and R.A.F. headquarters were about seven miles away on the other side of the city and in an area that suffered very badly from this first blitz. R.A.F. headquarters were hit and telephone communication between Stormont Castle and their headquarters was therefore destroyed. It was not considered right to issue a communiqué from Stormont Castle although we had information as to the extent of the damage and could have done so. To meet the situation a despatch rider at Stormont Castle drove his motor cycle from the Castle down into the heart of the town, through the most badly battered area and through the heaviest part of the raid to R.A.F. headquarters. There he waited for the R.A.F. side of the communiqué and returned by the same route to Stormont Castle. This man, like thousands of others in Great Britain, was one of the unsung heroes of Britain's darkest days. The communiqué was written at Stormont Castle and was delivered in his own car by the Regional Officer who had a hazardous time in the centre of the city, avoiding streets in which there were UXBs and lines that were carrying water to the N.F.S. The communiqué was in the hands of the newspapers at 5 a.m. and the All Clear sounded at 5.5 a.m. The first run of the newspapers carried the first communiqué. A second was issued at noon, revealing that Belfast bore the brunt of the attack, because in the period between 5 a.m. and noon the German radio had constantly broadcast the fact that Belfast had been bombed. The rest of the German communiqué was largely supposition, as they claimed the destruction of our famous shipyards, when in fact comparatively little damage was done there and the main result of the attack from the German point of view was the destruction of workers’ homes. There was a little ground haze that particular night and as the enemy s attack was directed to the north side of the city it was regarded as possible that the German pilots had mistaken two reservoirs on the hills to the north side for the docks and had, therefore, plastered the area around. The docks themselves were shrouded in a rather heavy haze which happily was with us on most evenings and helped to conceal the vital targets.

The Ministry's service was really in operation from before 5 a.m. and for six days by 7 a.m. the Ministry's officers were in the City Hall, Belfast, to 225 meet the representatives of the authorities who were brought into the Government plan. There was a very big task ahead and no time was wasted in making contact with the Town Clerk, the City Surveyor, and particularly the Superintendent Officer of Health. There was immediate work for the Ministry to do as the water mains on the south side of the city had been damaged and there was the fear of affected water supplies. The Ministry, inside two hours, had a very large number of posters displayed in all parts of the south side of the city, advising people to boil water before use. The loud-speaker vehicles were out on the road by nine a.m. broadcasting this information and also giving news regarding the location of rest centres and arrangements for evacuation and transport. For six days the loud-speaker service worked at full pressure and we received a variety of requests for broadcast announcements. The city was divided into geographical areas and separate cars were detailed to cover each area broadcasting from fixed points so that people would get a better reception as it was discovered that from a moving vehicle statements were distorted and therefore not easily understood. Among the less usual announcements was from Harland and Wolff shipyards appealing for 100 Joiners and 100 labourers to report to one particular job. Many of the factory workers inadvertently became sightseers and many wondered whether their firms were in operation. The Ministry’ s cars were able to assist firms to a large degree in getting workers back into the factories. For the Ministry of Food we did a series of broadcasts regarding the issue of emergency ration cards and the location of emergency feeding centres. The first impact of the raid and the immediate flood of announcements were almost forgotten when, on April 20th, we received information that a UXB had been discovered in the central Army barracks in Belfast and before this could be exploded the Ministry had to advise the residents of the surrounding area of the imminence of the explosion and of the measures to be taken to lessen the effects of the blast.

The Ministry was in daily contact with the Minister of Public Security and put out all the statements for that Department and civic Departments. Relations with the Press were so familiar that important advertisements were accepted over the telephone when ‘phoned by the R.I.O. or his deputy. There was no such thing as “red tape” in the relations between the Regional staff and the newspapers and the same spirit permeated right through the organisation. Petrol coupons were issued rapidly to volunteer car drivers and to members of the public whose cars were being used to evacuate women and children. The Press were constant visitors to the Ministry's advanced headquarters and were kept fully informed of the progress of plans to counter the difficult situation. The small Ministry staff had to work very long hours but the spirit prevailing among the staff and the willing help that was always available from members of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Scouts Association made the difficult task less irksome.

The Ministry operated from the City Hall for a few days and then moved to Government offices in the city, closing down the emergency broadcasting service on the sixth day. Regular reports were sent to Ministry Headquarters, London, who were kept posted all the time of the latest state of affairs. The Ministry of Public Security were, of course, in constant contact with the authorities across the Channel and N.F.S. units were sent over from Britain to relieve the weary fire fighters who stayed on the job in Belfast continually. The tasks of the loudspeaker service in the heavy raids were, as will be realised, very varied. The most solemn task was the marshalling of crowds to visit Mays Markets in Belfast to walk in procession past unidentified bodies, and the loud-speakers were also used to marshal the mourners at the mass funerals of the victims.

The May 5th raid raised a problem not present at the first raid. This was due to the fact that a conduit from the power station was affected and at 9 o'clock in the morning the Minister of Public Security informed the Ministry that we had not enough power to sound sirens if enemy air activity was resumed. We were discussing with the Minister the putting out of a statement advising the public to regard the opening of gunfire as the signal for enemy activity, but this, it was thought, would have a disquieting effect on the people who would assume we had no power to sound sirens and would, therefore, regard the position as serious. It was with a feeling of great relief that when enemy aircraft, apparently on reconnaissance, were over Belfast at noon that day, a squeak and later a real came from our many sirens. That was probably the only welcome sound we heard in those days except for the All Clear which always followed the raids.

The story so far inadequately describes the plans made to deal with post raid emergency conditions. They were duplicated in Londonderry and our mobile loudspeakers and our staff would have gone there if the need had arisen.

There were careful plans made for the greater emergency of invasion, they were never brought into operation in this Region. We had secret talks with the B.B.C. regarding the use of loudspeaker transmitters for broadcasting in invasion conditions. We had Emergency Information Officers, sixteen of them, in various parts of the Province. They were all Editors of newspapers who were to act under instructions from Regional Headquarters and under instructions from the Local Invasion Committees if they were isolated from Belfast. Here the Government took the place of Regional Commissioners in England and they had their full plans made for carrying on Northern Ireland as a separate entity. The Ministry's services during this time included the planning of a service for the dissemination of day to day news to be received from London with a special radio receiving set and the Ministry did quite a lot of work in providing drafts of speeches for Home Guard officers and others to advise the civil population as to their behaviour in an invasion. We had a strong Home Guard which was armed well in advance of the Home Guard in Britain because we had a nucleus of a fighting force already in existence. Happily the emergency plans for invasion were never brought into operation but the spirit of the authorities and the general public would, I think, have ensured the success of their operation should the need ever have arisen.

No Regional organisation of the Ministry could have had greater co-operation or worked more happily with another Government Department than this regional staff did with the Ministry of Public Security, whose senior officers, carrying a heavy responsibility, were always co-operative and helpful to the Ministry of Information and its many-sided activities. Our own junior staff rose to the occasion with a true loyalty that was an encouragement to the two senior officers.