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COWES AIR RAID - NIGHT MAY 4th - 5th

The Deputy Regional Commissioner (Mr. Asbury) ordered a post-blitz conference at Northbrook House, Cowes, at 12.30 hours May 5th. This information was not issued by Regional Headquarters until 9.07 hours. Osman and Ede left by road at 9.45 a.m. to make the rendezvous at Portsmouth Fire Station at 11.15. There the N.F.S. was detailed to check in the party and transport them by launch to the Isle of Wight.

Most of the post-blitz conference party made the rendezvous on time except the Deputy Regional Commissioner and his officers. The party waited at Portsmouth Fire Station until after noon when there was still no news of the Regional Headquarters staff and the party moved off without them.

It was by this time impossible to arrive in Cowes for the 1230 conference. The launch had to put in at Ryde in compliance with shipping restrictions at Cowes. At Ryde a motorbus took the party to West Cowes. Just before the bus reached the town, it met the Deputy Commissioner's car leaving Cowes and one of his officers informed the party that the conference would be held at Newport at 3.15. That meant an almost immediate turn-round and return to Newport but it was agreed that the last quarter of a mile to Cowes should be covered in the hope that there would be time for the party to get into touch with the various officials on the spot.

Road diversions, however, delayed the journey and as it was impossible to drive into the town itself because of the damage and of unexploded bombs, the party had to leave the bus on the outskirts. Only ten minutes could he allowed for the members of the party to see the town before the bus had to start on its journey back to Newport.

Thus at the conference, which was held at the County Hall, none of the Reading people had any first-hand knowledge. The following facts were learned from local officials:

The greater part of the damage was to industrial property, although there was a considerable amount of civilian damage. Four factories were destroyed and 20 others damaged, between 4000 and 5000 workers being affected. It was expected however that many of them would be able to do some sort of work and others would be set to work on demolition and repair. The canteens at White's and Saunders-Roe were both destroyed and 2500 mid-day meals would be needed the following day.

A rough estimate of the casualties was given as 51 killed and 180 injured.

All A.R.P. services were fully extended and a great deal of help was given by the military. This included the service of a field ambulance unit. Royal Engineers undertook demolition work.

Houses damaged numbered between 200 and 300 and between 500 and 600 homeless were dealt with at six rest centres and billeted before the end of the day.

No food stocks were damaged and it was stated that the feeding facilities were adequate, including the supply of meals to the factories.

Water supplies to domestic consumers were partially affected, but the drought had depleted the reservoirs and sea water would be used.

Electricity supplies were interrupted and this in turn affected the gas supply at West Cowes which depends upon electricity for feeding operations and the supply was reduced to one tenth. The West Cowes 40 - 2 -system had about twelve fractures which were under repair but a call was made for 12 military to do manual stoking until civilian labour could be recruited. The Last Cowes gas position was worse.

Communications position was bad following serious damage to the exchange. At the time of the conference 12 subscribers were connected but there was only one doubtful line to the mainland (to Southampton) and that failed later. The industrial people urged the quick restoration of the air-raid warning system at the principal factories which, it was felt, would help towards the return of the workpeople.

Roads were reasonably clear although there were a number of diversions because of unexploded bombs. Railways continued their normal service until later in the day when there were suspensions for the same reason and supplementary road transport had to be arranged.

As to the emergency information service, the resources of the local Urban District Council seemed to have been sufficient. An Information Centre (which M.O.I. representatives visited for a few minutes) was opened at Northbrook House and was reasonably well used. The necessary information for bombed people was available at the rest centres and there appeared to be no evidence of people lacking information and direction. The police superintendent stated that he had two loudspeaker cars but he did not find it necessary to use them.

The offer of the loudspeaker vans which we had ordered to stand by at Portsmouth and Southampton was not accepted and no reason why it should have been accepted was apparent.

It was unnecessary for M.O.I. representatives to stay and they returned to headquarters the same night. Several representatives of the departments concerned with communications and industrial restoration remained.

7th May, 1942.